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ABSTRACT 
As the United States achieved preeminence in the Pacific during World War II, 
political and military leaders faced a fundamental question about what to do with the 
islands of Guam, Okinawa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, which were seized by 
military force. As leaders deliberated long-term strategy, the U.S. military undertook a 
significant civil-military effort to govern liberated and occupied territories. While these 
initiatives initially facilitated immediate military objectives to further prosecute the war, 
they later served as a foundation upon which the United States built a new security order 
in the Pacific. These were not predetermined outcomes, however. U.S. policy underwent 
years of discourse to establish defense requirements, secure military bases, and maintain 
legitimacy in the international community. Though devastated during the war, the 
populations of these occupied areas still held political and social agency. How did the 
diverse civil-military interactions exemplified by these three cases shape the development 
of long-term basing agreements in the Pacific? 
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As Isaac Newton wrote, “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of 
giants.”1 My time at the Naval Postgraduate School has undoubtedly allowed me to see 
further; and while I cannot claim to be as revelatory as Newton, I must also attribute my 
insights to those who have helped me. This thesis is the product of years of study inspired 
by personal and professional relationships with Marines, Sailors, mentors, teachers, 
friends, and family. I am fortunate to have learned from so many great people.  
First, I am thankful to the Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen with whom I have 
been honored to serve. The Marines of Baker Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, taught 
me the meaning of service and the value of understanding local perspectives in Fallujah, 
Iraq. With the 5th Marines in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, I learned the importance of 
long-term strategy and the difficulty in connecting military objectives. It was while training 
on Guam, Tinian, and Okinawa with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, that I wondered how these 
islands became so peaceful 75 years after being among the most violent places in the world.  
I must also thank my professional mentors and the outstanding officers from whom 
I have learned. In particular, I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel James “Ben” Reid, 
with whom I served in Iraq, Okinawa, and Hawaii. From Lieutenant Colonel Reid, I truly 
appreciated the meaning of being a Marine officer. Under his tutelage, I also developed the 
passion for academic rigor, for he taught me that officers develop the plans and policies 
that determine the fate of their Marines. 
Passion is only meaningful with direction, however. For direction, I must thank the 
numerous professors, scholars, teachers, and writers from whom I have learned. From the 
Hawaii Department of Education to the Naval Postgraduate School and everywhere in 
between, countless educators have developed my knowledge of the world. I have been 
impressed with the quality and dedication of our faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Their service to our country is the modern-day incarnation of the cooperation between the 
 
1 Isaac Newton, personal letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675, HSP Digital Library, 
https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/9792#. 
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Navy and academics that began in World War II. I must especially thank Professor Daniel 
Moran and Professor Robert Weiner for shaping the development of this thesis. 
I must also thank my fellow students in Monterey, both at the Middlebury Institute 
of International Studies and the Naval Postgraduate School. One of the greatest aspects of 
the United States military is the acceptance of discourse in the decision-making process. 
Through our personal and professional interactions, my peers have challenged my ideas, 
presented new ones, and in the process improved both of our perspectives.  
I thank my family, who were my first teachers. Everything good in me I first learned 
from my family. My father, Arnold, exemplified service to his community, both nationally 
as a Vietnam veteran and locally as a teacher and coach. My mother, Carole, a high school 
math teacher, encouraged my curiosity and inspired an appreciation for knowledge. At 
every step in life, my sister, Meris, laid a path of academic, athletic, and leadership 
achievements for me to follow. I am continually compelled by the decades of cumulative 
contributions that enabled me, the descendant of immigrant coal miners and plantation 
workers, to undertake graduate education in the service of our country.  
Finally, I thank my wife, Amanda. Thank you for thoughts, insights, and support 
as I wrote throughout all hours of the night. You also taught me the most important lessons 
in life—how to love and to hope again for the future after years at war. Experiences are 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the United States achieved preeminence in the Pacific during World War II, 
political and military leaders faced a fundamental question—What was to be done with the 
islands seized by military force? As leaders deliberated long-term strategy, the U.S. 
military undertook a significant civil-military effort to govern liberated and occupied 
territories. While these initiatives initially facilitated immediate military objectives to 
further prosecute the war, they later served as a foundation upon which the United States 
built a new security order in the Pacific. These efforts were received with varying measures 
of support from the local populations. In the former Japanese Mandated Islands of 
Micronesia, an ambivalent population initially welcomed U.S. forces, then incrementally 
sought autonomy after years of direct U.S. administration. In Guam, a pre-war U.S. 
territory, the population largely welcomed U.S. forces as liberators. In turn, the U.S. 
eventually granted citizenship and self-governance while retaining significant basing 
rights. In Okinawa, the local population initially met U.S. forces with skepticism, then 
welcomed reconstruction aid, but disagreed over issues of land use, sovereignty, and long-
term basing of U.S. forces.  
These were not predetermined outcomes, however. U.S. policy underwent years of 
discourse in order to establish defense requirements, secure military bases, and maintain 
legitimacy in the international community. Though devastated during the war, the 
populations of these occupied areas still held political and social agency. How did the 
diverse civil-military interactions exemplified by these three cases shape the development 
of long-term basing agreements in the Pacific? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States’ post–World War II occupation of Japan and its former 
possessions is frequently heralded as an example of strategically capitalizing on the 
outcome of military conflict. Once-bitter adversaries became allies in mutual defense. 
Japan democratized and constitutionally embraced liberal American values. Meanwhile the 
2 
United States retained its influence and preeminence in the Western Pacific through a 
network of military bases in Japan and its former possessions. Yet, as time passes, this 
phenomenon is at risk of being taken for granted, dissociated from the motivations, 
mechanisms, and context that contributed to this outcome.  
Within the Department of Defense, critical analysis of this era has ebbed. Joint 
Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, dated 8 February 2001, described military 
government as “a last resort” for post-conflict governance.1 The term “military 
government” only appeared twice in the 2001 edition, was completely eliminated from the 
2008 update of the publication, and only reappeared in the glossary of the 2013 update. 
The 9 July 2018 update of Joint Publication 3-57 recently reintroduced military 
government as a doctrinal method to enable civil authorities.2 Additionally, the 2018 
version included a vignette on the importance of military government: “following the 
invasion of Iraq [in 2003], coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq; 
thus coalition forces were unable to completely dominate the operational environment. 
Civilian factions resorted to violence in order to assert political dominance; chaos 
ensued.”3  
The ways and means that contributed to post-war security have only recently 
regained prominence following contemporary U.S. military experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In “Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities,” Lieutenant Colonel 
David Mueller argued that the military must assume the onus for post-war stability and 
governance.4 In his paper, Mueller argued, “occupation duties are the inevitable result of 
most offensive operations. We need to recognize that a military unprepared for occupation 
 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 
(Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), I-19. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3764. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), II-11. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/
jp3_57.pdf. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff,  II-13. 
4 David A. Mueller, “Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities,” Joint Force Quarterly 




is likewise unprepared for offensive operations.”5 This essay won the Strategic Research 
Paper category of the 2016 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay 
Competition. The accolades for this thesis and the revisions of Joint Publication 3-57, both 
emanating from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signal the importance of civil-
military operations from the perspective of the military’s top leaders. As the United States 
military prepares for an era of great power competition, recounting the means and ways in 
which the United States translated military achievements into long-term strategic benefit 
may prove valuable. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The motivations for creating an American-based network of defense alliances in 
the Pacific are a point of debate among scholars. John Ikenberry argued that the United 
States elected to restrain its own military power after World War II through institutions 
and alliances in order to gain legitimacy, reduce fears of American hegemony, and entrench 
its long-term global influence.6 Ikenberry likened this approach as an up-front payment in 
United States’ power in order to gain long-term returns on investment. In the Pacific, 
Ikenberry’s model of institutions resulted in overseas military bases under the legal 
framework of bilateral or multilateral security agreements.  
Victor Cha argued that the United States deliberately selected a “hub and spoke” 
model of bilateral alliances in the Pacific to both maximize its political, economic, and 
military influence in the region and to restrain otherwise-eager anti-Communist allies.7 
Cha termed this as the “powerplay,” whereby the United States exerted significant 
influence in the Pacific due to its central position in the regional alliance network.8 As a 
result of these diplomatic maneuvers, the United States gained access to bases that 
supported this power dynamic. 
 
5 Mueller. 
6 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17–20. 
7 Victor Cha, Powerplay: the Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 3. 
8 Cha, 4. 
4 
The U.S. Navy’s official account of its military government in Micronesia 
demurred on the policy battles that created the Trust Territory. While its author, Dorothy 
Richard, acknowledged the policy debates within the United States Government, and that 
Secretary of Navy Forrestal was “sincerely disturbed about the proposed trusteeship of the 
Pacific Islands,” she summarized that “lack of immediate decision at the close of the war 
as to the status and disposition of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands forced the extension 
of naval military government.”9 This suggested that the Navy remained outside of policy 
deliberations regarding the future of occupied areas.  
Many scholars, however, detailed the political maneuvers that the Department of 
the Navy, Department of War, Department of State, and the Department of Interior took to 
advance their organizations’ interests. In his seminal work on civil-military relations, The 
Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argued that the United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff rose to unparalleled preeminence in foreign policy creation during World War II. 
Huntington stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 1945 were “next to the President, the 
single most important force in the overall conduct of the war.”10 Admiral William Leahy, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945, concurred with this sentiment when he stated, 
“the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the present time, are under no civilian control whatsoever.”11 
John Dower continued this assertion and stated that, in occupied Japan, “MacArthur was 
the indisputable overlord of occupied Japan, and his underlings were mere viceroys.”12 
Both Friedman and Nicholas Sarantakes also argued the United States military retained its 
prominence in creating foreign policy post-World War II.  
Hal Friedman suggested that the network of military bases was driven primarily by 
the United States’ urge to create a defensive perimeter across the Western Pacific, and 
 
9 Dorothy E. Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
Volume II: The Postwar Military Government Era 1945–1947 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operation, 1957), 62, 87. 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 318. 
11 Huntington, 336. 
12 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company / The New Press, 2000), 205. 
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thereby prevent another disastrous attack similar to that on Pearl Harbor.13 This defensive 
concern, Friedman argued, then drove the United States’ foreign policy to obtain bases 
through a multitude of means. In the northern Mariana Islands, the United States pursued 
a strategy of trusteeship via the United Nations in order to retain exclusive control of the 
hard-won islands. In Guam, the United States resumed the prewar naval administration. In 
Okinawa, Sarantakes argued that the United States allowed Japan “residual sovereignty” 
over the island to secure bases while preserving legitimacy in the international 
community.14 This approach maintained American integrity within the international 
community and also allowed for uncontested control of the strategically vital islands. Only 
once American base were guaranteed, could the United States and Japan formally sign the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Treaty for Mutual Security and Cooperation.15 
Relatedly, but separate from the theories on alliances, Kent Calder created a 
framework to understand the political dynamics of U.S. military bases overseas. Calder’s 
“Paradigm for Base Politics” classified interactions according to the presence of coercion 
and material benefit wielded in each case.16 Bazaar politics, fiat politics, compensation 
politics, and affective politics vary according to their combination of material benefits and 
coercion wielded by the host country. Affective politics occur when the host nation wields 
neither coercion nor material benefit, and instead relies on shared values, identities, or other 
social constructs to assure foreign bases. Fiat politics occur when the host nation wields 
coercion, but no material benefits, and most often occurs in dictatorships. In the paradigm 
of bazaar politics, the host nation wields material benefits and coercion to increase the 
palatability of bases. Calder specifically classified Japan in the paradigm of compensation 
politics, where the state wields material benefits, but no coercion, to maintain bases 
throughout the country.17 This research helps bridge the divide between alliance politics 
 
13 Hal Friedman, Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the 
Pacific Basin, 1945–1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2000), 35–36. 
14 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese 
Relations (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 58–59. 
15 Sarantakes, Keystone, 59. 
16 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 127–153. 
17 Calder, 130–136. 
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at the international level and basing rights at the national and local level. Thus, Calder’s 
framework is applicable to Guam and the Trust Territories, who significantly interacted 
with the U.S. military governments and bases, but outside the scope of an alliance. While 
Calder’s framework is instrumental in explaining the continuity of military bases overseas, 
his analysis leaves space to study the creation of the U.S. base network in the Pacific. His 
framework, though, opens the door to understanding how domestic factors at the regional 
and national level affect U.S. basing initiatives. 
While the creation of U.S. foreign policy post–World War II is relatively well 
researched, fewer accounts exist that detail the domestic politics of Micronesia and 
Okinawa of the same era. Much of the predominant research conducted by U.S. 
government agencies understandably depicts U.S. rather than local perspectives in order to 
capture organizational lessons learned. This prevailing focus, however, risks 
oversimplifying the role of local actors in affecting the outcome of U.S. military bases. 
Richard’s chronicle of Naval military government in Micronesia depicted local society as 
such: “There was no tradition or experience of areal unity and no desire for such unity on 
the part of the people. Years of subjugation to foreign administrators had stunted their 
political development and deadened their initiative.”18 Arnold Fisch’s Military 
Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950, published by the U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, recounted that Okinawa’s political revitalization began with rudimentary 
organization in refugee camps, and then continued under military government guidance 
and assistance.19 Sarantakes also depicted the U.S. military government as the impetus for 
local political revival. Sarantakes pointed to the appointment of Shikiya Koshin as 
Okinawan governor on 25 April 1946 as the key event that led to Okinawan political 
participation.20 
Several scholars have depicted the political development of these occupied areas 
from the perspective of the local population, though. These accounts are most significant 
 
18 Richard, Volume II, 280. 
19 Arnold G. Fisch Jr., Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, 1988), 102–107 
20 Sarantakes, Keystone, 34. 
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for their description of pre-war governance that later affected post-war social and political 
development. In the former Japanese Mandated Islands, Mark Peattie described in detail 
the effects of the Japanese administration on the indigenous populations. Peattie described 
Japanese administration as “intensive and dominating,” which left indigenous rulers as 
“minor functionaries in a bureaucratic structure.”21 While this outwardly echoed Richard’s 
description, Peattie added important nuance to his description of Micronesian society. The 
peoples of the Japanese Mandated Islands were not only affected by the administration, but 
also participated in ways that affected their post-war bureaucratic capabilities. Peattie 
suggested that native political leaders were not simply underdeveloped; rather, they 
accepted accommodation for legitimizing a foreign administration.22 This transactional 
form of political participation would be a model for future interactions with the U.S. Naval 
Administration.  
Guam, like its Micronesian neighbors, also existed under foreign administration 
before the war, but benefitted from being on the winning side. Timothy Maga argued that 
Guamanians parlayed their support for America during the war into political activism that 
led to increased accommodation from the United States.23 Thus, Guam spent its political 
capital, acquired through more than fifty years of operating within the American system, 
to increase its returns after the war.  
In Okinawa, Mikio Higa described how Okinawan political parties were 
consolidated to support the war and failed to develop competitive politics.24 Postwar 
Okinawan political parties then developed independently from Japan, albeit inspired by 
political revival in mainland Japan.25 These parties, such as the Okinawa Democratic 
 
21 Mark R. Peattie, Nanyo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 68, 76.  
22 Peattie, 76. 
23 Timothy P. Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” Pacific Historical Review 
53, no. 1 (February 1984): 59–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3639379. 
24 Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver, Canada: University of British 
Columbia, 1963), 22–23. 
25 Higa, 27. 
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Alliance, Okinawa People’s Party, and Okinawa Socialist Party, all espoused 
democratization, thought the implications of that term ranged from alliance with the United 
States to autonomy.26 Though instructive, Okinawan political participation had its limits. 
Higa argued that the war reshuffled political elites that only slowly regrouped following 
the devastation.27 Thus, political opposition to U.S. administration, or at least viable 
alternatives, had to overcome both the physical devastation of the war and their stunted 
political development prior to the war.  
In the midst of this upheaval, military government teams landed on the former 
Mandated Islands, Guam, and Okinawa to establish U.S. control. Navy military 
government had three primary functions in Micronesia: “reduction of active and passive 
sabotage, implementation of policies,” and “restoration of civilian living conditions to 
normal.”28 Similarly, military government in Okinawa sought to further national policies, 
fulfill obligations under international law, and assist military operations.29 The 
“implementation of policies” implied military policies until political guidance was 
received. In the Pacific, this translated to exclusive, indefinite U.S. control. As Richard 
summarized the guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff towards the Japanese Mandated 
Islands, “no forces under their [military government] control would take any action, make 
any plans, agreements or statements which directly or by implication might serve as a basis 
for any nation other than the United States obtaining sovereignty or any other territorial 
rights therein.”30 Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas 
(CINCPOA), recognized, however, that local populations could affect the U.S. basing 
interest. As Richard recounted CINCPOA’s perspective on military government, 
“successful implementation of the objectives depended to a great extent upon native 
attitudes. Accordingly, relations with the people of the islands were handled with great 
 
26 Higa, 27–28. 
27 Higa, 24. 
28 Richard, Volume II, 163. 
29 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950, 21. 
30 Richard, Volume II, 164. 
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care.”31 U.S. objectives, as outlined initially by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were not always 
congruent with native attitudes, however. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Several possible factors help explain how the United States translated military 
achievements into long-term political and military hegemony in the region. Research will 
examine the domestic factors in the U.S. and occupied areas that shaped base politics, how 
military governments affected these forces, and the creation of U.S. foreign policy in the 
Pacific after World War II. 
First, years of foreign administration affected the societies and base politics of 
Guam, Japanese Mandated Islands, and Okinawa. On Guam, the U.S. naval administration 
that began in 1898 continued years of foreign administration under Spain and inhibited the 
development of indigenous administrators, bureaucracies, and identities. On Okinawa, 
years of political incorporation and social assimilation culminated in the devastation of 
World War II. On the Japanese Mandated Islands, direct colonial administration and mass 
immigration similarly affected indigenous political and social organization. In these areas, 
years of foreign administration inhibited resistance to military bases and facilitated the 
transition from Japanese to U.S. control.  
In the wake of the war, U.S. military government units maintained order and filled 
the political void in occupied areas across the Pacific. Additionally, the military 
governments bought the United States time to deliberate, formulate, and apply national 
policies to the political vacuum created in these areas. As indigenous political and social 
movements reemerged after the war, military governments also played an important role 
in mitigating the tensions between U.S. and local interests. The ways in which military 
government teams informed, refined, and applied policies affected the outcomes on the 
northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa. Military government teams bridged this 
divide between the reality created by previous administrations and U.S. policy ambitions. 
 
31 Richard, Volume II, 165. 
10 
In doing so, Military government teams established a foundation of civil-military relations 
upon which long-term military bases were built. 
During World War II, the United States military, and particularly the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, rose to preeminence in foreign policy creation and fiercely advocated for a 
network of overseas bases to establish a forward line of defense. This influence resulted in 
a strong military voice in American diplomacy. As such, the plan to retain the areas 
occupied by military government gained hold in the highest levels of government. 
Following World War II, the United States also exploited ambiguous claims to 
territorial interstices in order to secure military bases. Both the Japanese Mandated Islands 
and Okinawa were indirectly referenced in the Allies’ Potsdam Declaration, which 
established the terms for Japanese surrender. This ambiguity created a sovereignty vacuum 
in which the United States exerted its force.  
Later, the Cold War coalesced United States foreign policy into the broad objective 
of countering Communism worldwide, which unified disparate departments of the federal 
government to seek military establishments overseas. While the State Department and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff diverged in their approach to obtaining these bases, they concurred 
with the strategic impetus to secure overseas bases in the Pacific. These efforts, pursued 
through a variety of legal and diplomatic mechanisms, affirmed the precepts of the Atlantic 
Charter that the United States was committed to the self-determination of liberated peoples 
and opposed to territorial expansion. The United Nations granted the United States strategic 
trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, which included exclusive military 
access. In Okinawa, United States bases continued within the framework of the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in 1951. These maneuvers fulfilled the United 
States’ obligations under international law and reinforced United States legitimacy in the 
international community. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research will examine three case studies involving significant interaction between 
United States Navy military governments and civilian populations: the population of the 
northern Mariana Islands and the United States Navy military government between 1944 
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and 1951; Guamanians and the Navy Military Government between 1944 and 1951; and 
Okinawans and the United States Navy and Army military government between 1945 and 
1951. These cases were occupied by Japan during World War II, seized by United States 
forces, administered by United States Navy military governments, and later transferred to 
U.S. civilian administration to facilitate long-term security interests. These cases will serve 
to intertwine the U.S. policy objectives with indigenous governance initiatives to illuminate 
the ways in which military governments resolved these forces.  
Both Okinawa and the northern Mariana Islands circa 1944–1951 contained 
multiple similarities that make them interesting for comparison. Both areas were brought 
under Japanese control relatively recently before World War II, and both areas contained 
ethnicities and cultures that were distinct from their Japanese rulers. Through decades of 
Japanese rule, these two populations experienced heavy social assimilation and political 
incorporation. 
Despite their similarities, the northern Marianas and Okinawa diverged in their 
security relationship with the United States. In the northern Marianas, direct U.S. military 
administration continued after the war and was transferred to civilian administration by the 
Department of the Interior via a United Nations Strategic Trusteeship. In Okinawa, direct 
U.S. military administration continued after the war. First administered by the Navy, then 
transferred to the Army, the U.S. maintained this security arrangement until 1972. 
Guam, in contrast, was a U.S. possession prior to World War II and was 
administered by the U.S. Navy until Japan seized the island in the opening days of the war. 
Guamanians’ identity as Americans, manifested through their resistance to Japanese 
occupation and the political institutions they developed under military government tenure, 
mobilized efforts to increase autonomy. As a result, the United States ceded concessions 
to the population in order to maintain access. 
Eventually, Okinawa reverted to Japanese control and maintained U.S. bases under 
the umbrella of the Treaty for Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United 
States. Meanwhile, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands later gained independence 
through the Compact of Free Association, becoming several island nations that relied on 
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the United States for defense and federal services. Guamanians obtained citizenship and 
self-governance, but also accepted long-term basing of military forces. These cases seek to 
illuminate the diplomatic, bureaucratic, and operational approaches that linked the United 
States’ unprecedented military achievements in World War II to a long-term security 
network in the western Pacific that endured through the Cold War and to present day. 
These particular cases in civil military operations are still relevant today. The 
Compact of Free Association, which granted exclusive U.S. military access, is due for 
renegotiation in 2022. On Okinawa, protests against military bases are persistent, ongoing, 
and a factor that may affect the strategic disposition of U.S. forces. Guam is the potential 
destination for thousands of U.S. Marines relocated from Okinawa, but is strongly resisting 
aspects of the new bases. These cases require a historical understanding of American 
involvement in order to maintain U.S. interests in the long term. 
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II. PRE-WAR BASE POLITICS IN OKINAWA, THE MARIANA 
ISLANDS, AND GUAM  
This chapter examines the environments and characteristics that shaped base 
politics on Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam before and during World War II. 
Environmentally, the chapter discusses the history, demography, and governance of these 
islands before and during the Pacific War. Characteristically, it discusses local levels of 
base protest and support, and assesses the levels of social and cultural assimilation 
demonstrated through institutions of education, language, and religion. Finally, the chapter 
applies Calder’s paradigms of base politics to each location in order to contextualize 
historical civil-military interactions. Although these islands developed under separate pre-
war administrations, the islands shared similar histories, characteristics, and environments 
that would shape their post-war outcomes. With this foundation established, later chapters 
will examine how each of these three cases changed as a result of the war, and how these 
changes affected long-term U.S. basing agreements. 
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING BASE POLITICS 
In Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism, Kent 
E. Calder analyzed the politics surrounding overseas U.S. military bases circa 2007. Calder 
took a multi-disciplinary approach to base politics, and analyzed the individual, domestic, 
national, and international variables that determined outcomes. Accordingly, Calder 
categorized individual motives for participating in base politics, paradigms in which sub-
national entities participate in base politics, and historical hypothesis that determine future 
prospects for base support.  
Calder categorized three primary motives for individuals to participate in base 
politics: ideological, nationalistic, and pragmatic. Ideological participants engage with 
bases on philosophical grounds, while nationalistic participants support or defend bases for 
their effect on national sovereignty. Calder described pragmatic participants as those 
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concerned with the environmental, criminal, and material effects of bases.32 Calder also 
noted the importance of catalysts in base protests, and specifically correlated military 
mishaps and egregious crimes with an increase in base protests.33  
Calder then classified four paradigms in which national leaders engage in base 
politics. Bazaar politics, fiat politics, compensation politics, and affective politics vary 
according to their combination of material benefits and coercion wielded by the host 
country. Bazaar politics occur when a host nation trades compensation for cooperation. 
Fiat politics occur when a host nation wields coercion, but no material benefits, and most 
often occurs in dictatorships. Compensation politics occur when a host nation does not 
coerce its constituents, but rather compels support through material benefits. Affective 
politics occur when a host nation wields neither coercion nor material benefit, and instead 
relies on shared values, identities, or other social constructs to assure foreign bases.  
At the environmental level, Calder introduced five hypotheses for predicting 
general outcome of base politics. Contact hypothesis predicted that civil-military tensions 
correspondingly increase with the frequency of contact between the military and 
population. Calder measured population densities on and surrounding military bases to 
gauge the frequency of civil-military contact. Calder called this the “first cut” in 
understanding tensions in base politics.34 While additional variables, discussed below, may 
mitigate or inflame base tensions, greater contact between foreign militaries and local 
populations increases the likelihood of friction. 
Colonization hypothesis predicts that former colonies will resist military bases of 
former colonizers. The stronger the colonial experience, the more forcefully will the former 
colony seek to reject or oust foreign military bases. Though Calder did not provide a scale 
to measure the strength of a colonial relationship, he noted that external factors may also 
affect the outcome of base politics in the context of this model.  
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Similar to colonization hypothesis, Calder’s occupation hypothesis predicts that 
non-liberating military occupations will likely lead to broad popular opposition to foreign 
bases. Liberating occupations, conversely, can lead to broad popular support for foreign 
bases. Calder distinguished liberating from non-liberating occupations by their level of two 
main variables: legitimacy garnered during the occupation and the institutional reforms 
implemented during the occupation.35  
Regime-shift hypothesis correlates changes in host-nation regimes to the 
withdrawal of foreign military bases. These regime shifts complicate elite-driven decision 
processes in the host state, unleash the power of popular sentiments, and redefine the 
relationships between key actors in base politics.36 One likely scenario that Calder 
predicted is the withdrawal of foreign bases as a country transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic rule. 
Dictatorship hypothesis argues that the United States frequently supports dictatorial 
governments in order to maintain stability in base politics. Calder observed that 
dictatorships are a “superficially stabilizing refuge in the face of the uncertainties of regime 
change in a nation with significant foreign bases.”37 In the Cold War era, Calder further 
argued that the United States, and particularly the National Security Council, 
accommodated dictators in order to create strategic bulwarks against communism.38 
Calder’s framework is applied in this thesis to the sub-national entities of Guam, 
the Northern Marianas, and Okinawa to analyze the foundations of their later base politics. 
Though Calder’s framework did not assess instances of domestic military bases on 
sovereign territory, the framework is applied to Guam in this context due to its designation 
as a territory and not an incorporated state with direct representation in the U.S. 
government. Similarly, although the Northern Marianas would later become a U.S. 
territory, it began the war as a Japanese colony and subsequently entered a period of 
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sovereign ambiguity after the war. Finally, Okinawa entered the war incorporated into the 
Japanese Empire, but entered a period of sovereign ambiguity after the war. All three cases, 
in essence, experienced a type of regime shift when U.S. military governments established 
their authority over the war ravaged populations.  
In all three cases, history’s legacy proved to be as strong a factor as pragmatic 
motivators. As Calder himself noted, “historical origins, in short, are crucial to 
understanding the institutional environment in which base politics develops thereafter.”39 
Accordingly, this chapter will analyze the history and institutional development of 
Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam preceding their occupation by U.S. forces during 
the war. 
B. OKINAWA, A PREFECTURE OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE 
Although the Japanese Empire annexed the Ryukyu islands by force, Okinawa 
developed many aspects of affective politics prior to World War II. The Japanese 
administration appealed to nationalism, ideology, and pragmatism to build Okinawan 
support for imperial aggrandizement. With increased political representation, cultural 
assimilation, and few military impositions prior to the war, Okinawans enjoyed the benefits 
of the Empire with acceptable costs. This support manifested itself not only in the Japanese 
military bases that the islands hosted, but also in the culture, language, and identity of 
Okinawans. As the war progressed, however, Japan resorted to coercion in order to 
maintain Okinawan subjectivity. The devastation of the war would define Okinawan 
history, unleash popular anti-military sentiments, and call into question Okinawa’s very 
identity as Japanese. These resultant civil-military forces created during the Imperial 
Japanese era affected Okinawan base politics long after the war. 
The Japanese Empire deposed the Ryukyu Kingdom in March 1879 and 
subsequently incorporated Okinawa as a prefecture on 5 April 1879.40 Despite their 
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forceful absorption into the state, Okinawans gained political representation and legal 
equality under the Japanese Empire. In 1909, a Prefectural Assembly convened for the first 
time with representatives chosen by elected local council members.41 Okinawans then 
gained their first two representatives in the Lower House of the Diet in 1912.42 On 1 April 
1920, representation increased to five members in the 381-member body.43 In that same 
enactment of 1920, Okinawans also gained equal protection under Japanese law.44 
To overcome the divisive issues of history and ethnicity, the government of Japan 
promoted an ethno-Japanese Okinawan identity.45 These efforts focused on Okinawan 
education, language, religion, and patriotic duty to forge a united identity that would 
eventually support Japanese militarism. Years later, Yanagita Kunio, prominent Japanese 
scholar and ethnologist, asserted, “Okinawans are and were Japanese.”46 
Okinawan schools were the vanguard of Japan’s assimilation program. In 1916, the 
All-Okinawan Teachers Convention resolved to teach only Japanese and punish any use of 
the Ryukyuan language.47 Military drill and traditional Japanese martial arts accompanied 
academic studies.48 The level of government funding reflected Japan’s increased priority 
for assimilation through education. Between 1910 and 1935, annual education funds 
increased 25-fold, from 100,000 to 2,500,000 Yen.49 This increase in funding also enabled 
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educational initiatives to reach more Okinawans. By 1937, 100,000 students were enrolled 
in Okinawan primary schools.50  
The Japanese government also promoted the religion of State Shinto to reinforce 
Japanese nationalism. State Shinto venerated the holiness of the Japanese Emperor and, by 
association, the Japanese Empire. Although initial attempts to introduce State Shinto in 
1924 fell flat, subsequent efforts that merged Japanese spiritualism with Okinawan 
traditions proved more effective.51 After Japan provoked hostilities with China in 1931, 
the Japanese administration promoted State Shinto with renewed zeal, and pressured 
localities to build Shinto shrines.52 With savvy, these new shrines were prominently 
located with or in front of ancestral Okinawan places of worship.53 As with language, 
culture, and identity, the Japanese administration increasingly promoted a vision of 
Okinawa that was inseparable from Japan. 
The Okinawan population increased alongside political and social assimilation. In 
1903, Okinawa’s population was 480,000.54 By 1940, approximately 750,000 people lived 
in Okinawa Prefecture.55 This equated to a 56.2 percent increase over 38 years. This 
growth led to a population density of 588 Okinawans per square mile, compared to a ratio 
of 529 in mainland Japan.56 Due to this high level of population density and the worldwide 
economic depression of the 1920s, more than 54,000 Okinawans had emigrated overseas 
for economic opportunities by 1930.57 Overseas labor was also an important source of 
income for many Okinawans. In 1937 alone, 40,483 overseas Okinawans remitted an 
average of 88 Yen per person, in comparison with the average of 50 Yen per person for 
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overseas workers from all other Japanese prefectures.58 Okinawan laborers immigrated to 
the Japanese Mandated Islands in large numbers and would constitute a significant part of 
the Japanese population.59  
Although the Japanese government significantly invested in assimilating Okinawa 
since 1879, segments of Okinawans identified themselves as a distinctly separate culture 
and ethnicity. The scholar Iha Furyu, “father of Okinawan studies,” rose to prominence in 
1911 after publishing Ancient Ryukyu, in which he defined Okinawa as a distinct nation 
related to the Japanese nation.60 Iha’s work inspired subsequent intellectuals to consider 
the nature of Okinawan identity. In January 1940 Yanagi Soetsu, leader of the Mingei folk 
arts movement, declared that Okinawan clothing, arts, and language should be equally 
promoted alongside Japanese culture.61 This “language controversy” spread throughout 
the island via the local Okinawa nippo and Ryukyu shinpo newspapers.62 Officially, 
Okinawa Governor Fuchigami Fusataro denounced Yanagi’s Folk Art Association and 
declared that all traces of Okinawan identity must be forgotten.63 Okinawans themselves 
divided over whether to embrace modern Japanese practices or to retain traditional 
Okinawan culture. Though the war sidelined the issue, the incident exemplified the 
tensions in the Okinawan-Japanese relationship even before 1945.64  
Due to these sensitivities regarding Okinawan inclusion and equality, the Japanese 
Empire did not demand much militarily from Okinawa. Japan began nationwide military 
conscription in 1873, but Okinawans were not conscripted until 1898 due to their perceived 
substandard aptitude.65 Okinawans were similarly under-represented in the Japanese 
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military officer corps. Between 1897 and 1937, only 16 Okinawan men attended Japanese 
military or naval academies.66 And although Japan established its first military garrison on 
Okinawa in 1898, the archipelago was relatively free of military bases prior to the Pacific 
War.67 As the Japanese military increased its control of the national government, however, 
Japan increasingly prepared Okinawa and its inhabitants for war.  
Although historically underrepresented in the military, Japan attempted to prepare 
Okinawan citizens for the anticipated war effort. In 1934, the Japanese government 
established regulations for a National Spiritual Mobilization Training School that sought 
to imbue Okinawan youth with nationalistic militarism.68 In 1935, however, the Japanese 
commander of the Okinawan Garrison Forces, General Ishii Torao, publicly disparaged the 
fighting potential of Okinawan youths.69 While Okinawan youths were previously 
disqualified for military service at the highest rates in all of the prefectures, the Japanese 
army also had established minimum height and weight requirements slightly above 
Okinawan averages.70 The Okinawan public decried General Torao’s remarks as an affront 
to Okinawan pride, loyalty, and identity.71 Although officially proclaiming Okinawans to 
be Japanese, the Japanese military still differentiated between the two groups, even as 
military conflicts increased the demand for personnel.  
Okinawan civil liberties and political representation also decreased as the prospect 
of wider war increased. In March 1938, Japan passed the National General Mobilization 
Law that abrogated many of the individual rights of the Meiji constitution.72 In October 
1940, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was formed to promote “national 
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solidarity” for the war effort.73 Practically, however, the organization enabled Japanese 
bureaucrats to dominate Okinawan political offices. In June 1943, Japan politically 
reorganized for an increasingly dire situation, and Okinawa Prefecture was amalgamated 
into a new Kyushu District.74 Japanese political consolidation culminated in April 1944, 
when Japan declared martial law in Okinawa.75 The remaining Okinawan bureaucrats and 
law enforcement personnel were transferred to the Japanese military administration.  
In preparation for battle, the Japanese Empire not only controlled the political and 
legal bodies that once defined Okinawan assimilation, but also the mortal bodies of 
Okinawans. Concurrent with the declaration of martial law on 1 April 1944, the 32nd 
Imperial Japanese Army was established to defend Okinawa.76 After assembling 
piecemeal reinforcements from across the Empire, the 32nd Army activated the first units 
of the Okinawan Home Guards, Boetai, in June 1944.77 In January 1945, the Imperial 
Japanese Army mobilized approximately 17,000 additional Okinawans males between the 
age of 17 and 45.78 Years of assimilation also proved helpful in mobilizing Okinawan 
youths. The 32nd Army organized and trained 750 middle school students, age 14 years 
and older, to conduct guerrilla warfare in the anticipated battle.79 Additional drafts brought 
Boetai units to a total strength of approximately 20,000 by April 1945.80 As battle neared, 
the 32nd Army also augmented regular Japanese units with individual Okinawan 
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draftees.81 By April 1945, a total Japanese force of 100,000 prepared for battle, of which 
Okinawans constituted a significant part.82 
These civil-military measures did not prepare Okinawans for the events of the 
following months, however. On 1 April 1945, U.S. forces landed on Okinawa and wrested 
the island from Japanese control after 82 days of vicious combat. The Pacific War killed 
approximately 122,000 Okinawans by its end. 28,000 were killed while serving as soldiers 
or civilians in the military, while an additional 94,000 civilians were killed in the battle of 
Okinawa.83 As historian George Kerr observed, “no prefecture contributed so little to the 
preparation for war and its prosecution through the years, but none suffered as much in 
widespread misery, in loss of human lives and property, and in ultimate subservience to 
military occupation.”84 The price for involuntary assimilation with Japan in 1879 proved 
costly for a generation of Okinawans years later.  
C. THE MARIANA ISLANDS, A DISTRICT OF THE JAPANESE 
MANDATED ISLANDS 
Unlike the peoples of the Ryukyu Islands, the people of the Mariana Islands were 
politically, legally, and ethnically distinct from the Japanese. Although acquiring these 
islands nearly 20 years later than Okinawa, Japan nonetheless sought to assimilate 
Micronesians of the mandate into the Empire. Instead of political and legal integration, 
however, the Japanese administration demographically dominated the northern Marianas, 
and in so doing, ensured later support for its militarization of the islands. Although these 
variables indicated a strong likelihood for fiat politics, the disproportionate Japanese 
influence in politics and population instead resembled affective politics. The remaining 
indigenous actors did not simply accept domination, however, but instead accepted 
accommodation in the new Japanese administration. These civil-military foundations 
would influence subsequent U.S. administrations long after the war. 
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Japan seized the northern Mariana Islands from their previous imperial power, 
Germany, during World War I. Following the war, Japan maintained possession of the 
former German islands through a trusteeship governed by the League of Nations. The 
South Seas Mandate, also known as the Japanese Mandated Islands, included the Caroline 
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Mariana Islands less Guam. The Mandate was 
initially organized into six administrative districts, with government offices on the most 
significant islands of each district: Saipan, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.  
Japan administered the islands of Micronesia as a colony more than a trustee. This 
was in keeping with the mandate classification system, where Class A mandates were the 
most developed nations, while Class C mandates were the least developed. The League of 
Nations allowed Class C mandates such as Micronesia to be “administered under the laws 
of the Mandatory as integral portions thereof” due to the “sparseness of their population, 
or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization.”85 Japanese 
administration profoundly changed the Micronesian society, but not always in ways that 
upheld the “sacred trust of civilization” intended by the League of Nations.86  
The Japanese colonial bureaucracy in the Mandated Islands was as prohibitive to 
the local population as it was proficient. 950 Japanese bureaucrats administered the 
Mandated Islands, a striking comparison to the 25 German officials who managed the 
islands prior to World War I.87 While this commitment in personnel reflected Japan’s high 
level of interest in the Mandated Islands, it also marginalized traditional indigenous 
political actors. After establishing civil administration in 1922, the colonial governor 
reported directly to the Japanese Prime Minister.88 Furthermore, the colonial governor of 
the South Seas Mandate held jurisdiction over all legal matters pertaining to its inhabitants. 
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The Japanese constitution did not apply to Micronesia, as it was acquired through the 
League of Nations mandate and not considered sovereign territory.89  
Additionally, Japanese colonial administrators marginalized traditional sources of 
authority in Micronesia.90 As historian Mark Peattie observed, “below the lowest Japanese 
functionary in the branch government of the Nan’yo-cho, below the stern eye of the 
resident Japanese policeman, was the traditional Micronesian leadership.”91 While 
hereditary chiefs retained prestige, Japanese-appointed officials exercised authority. 
Peattie described Japanese administration as “intensive and dominating,” which left 
indigenous rulers as “minor functionaries in a bureaucratic structure.”92 While it was 
possible for native chiefs to hold both offices, the threat of obsolescence persisted.  
In the positions that indigenous peoples could hold, clear lines of subordination 
were established. While colonial policemen in Micronesia functioned in many more roles 
than traditional police, indigenous policemen were limited to assisting Japanese 
policemen.93 Furthermore, these constables were limited to those who were “under forty, 
were in good health, and had completed the optimum five years of primary school.”94 Only 
in 1929 were these indigenous policemen allowed to investigate cases involving Japanese 
nationals.95 Even then, the government maintained a two to one ratio of Japanese police to 
indigenous police.96 Still, this was relatively better than in other colonies of the Japanese 
Empire, where Japanese police maintained a four to one ratio over ethnic Chinese police.97 
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Though Micronesian participation in administration was limited, it reflected the Japanese 
belief that cooptation of the local populations was necessary for successful administration.  
Though not legally considered sovereign Japanese subjects, the Japanese 
nevertheless dominated the indigenous population of Micronesia socially and numerically. 
Near the beginning of the Japanese administration in 1920, 3,671 Japanese nationals lived 
in the Mandated Islands with 48,505 indigenous Micronesians. In 1937, those statistics 
rose to 58,861 Japanese compared to 50,741 Micronesians.98 By 1941, approximately 
93,000 Japanese lived in the Mandated Islands.99 The plurality of Japanese immigrants 
moved to the Mandated Islands to work in the expanding agriculture industry.100 These 
Japanese immigrants reshaped the cultural, political, and linguistic composition of the 
Mandated Islands.  
Saipan, the largest island in the northern Marianas, highlighted the effects of 
Japanese assimilation. In 1928, the Japanese administration owned 78 percent of land on 
Saipan and 88 percent of land on neighboring Rota.101 This state-owned land was 
apportioned to Japanese capitalist for development. In that same year, Japanese-owned 
enterprises produced 1,200 tons of sugar a day on Saipan.102 To fuel this agricultural boon, 
the Japanese administration imported labor from across the empire. In 1920, approximately 
2,500 Japanese inhabited Saipan with 4,000 Micronesians. By 1938, however, 
approximately 45,000 Japanese inhabited Saipan with 4,000 Micronesians.103 This 
equated to a 1,700 percent increase in the ethnic Japanese population over 29 years, 
compared to no increase in the indigenous Chamorro population.   
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Social and linguistic changes accompanied this economic and demographic 
transformation. As Felix Moos, Carl Lande, and Nobleza Asunción-Lande described, “the 
Micronesian islands were well on their way to becoming ‘Japanese islands,’ not simply in 
the externals of administration but in the internal attitudes and sentiments of their 
people.”104 Japanese-run schools in the mandate prioritized Japanese morals, the Japanese 
language, and basic math.105 The limits of this socialization would be tested when the 
Empire of Japan waged the Pacific War with the United States and its allies. 
As tensions rose in the Pacific, the Japanese military increased its military presence 
throughout the Mandated Islands and especially in the northern Mariana Islands. Between 
1934 and November 1940, Japan allocated a total of nearly $4,000,000 for general 
construction in the Mariana Islands.106 During this period, Japan developed the strategic 
Asilito Airfield in Saipan and an airfield on neighboring Tinian, ostensibly for civil 
aviation.107 From November 1940 to November 1941 alone, Japan allocated an additional 
$3,658,000 for airfields and military instillations in the Mariana Islands and nearly 
$24,000,000 for military bases throughout the rest of the Mandated Islands.108 In 
December 1940, 919 marines of the 5th Special Base Defense Force arrived on Saipan to 
“defend its assigned areas.”109 These forces were the largest and primary combat units 
stationed in the Mandated Islands prior to the Pacific War.110 In June of that year, the 
unit’s mission was amended to include “planning and preparation for the Guam invasion 
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operation.”111 Thus, on the eve of war, Japanese troops on the strategically vital island of 
Saipan consisted of approximately 1.88 percent of the island’s total population. 
As the Japanese empire mobilized for war, so did the peoples of the Mandated 
Islands. Prior to the Pacific War, the Japanese administration formed nationalistic youth 
leagues, seinendan, to organize and indoctrinate indigenous men and women.112 In the 
strictest interpretation of the League of Nations mandate, Japan was prohibited from 
conducting “military training of the natives.”113 Accordingly, these leagues promoted 
“knowledge and virtue, physical training, and public service” throughout each of the main 
islands in the Japanese Mandate. Following a model successfully applied in other areas of 
the empire, however, Japan parlayed these youth organizations into paramilitary 
organizations when hostilities initiated. Micronesian men volunteered for labor battalions, 
teishintei, to support the Japanese military throughout the mandated islands and service 
battalions, kesshitai, for service overseas.114 In the battles throughout Micronesia during 
World War II, approximately 10 percent of the indigenous population died.115 Thus, 
political opposition to foreign administration, or at least viable alternatives, had to 
overcome both the physical devastation of the war and their stunted political development 
prior to the war.  
The indigenous peoples of the Japanese Mandated Islands were not only affected 
by the foreign administration, but also participated in ways that affected their post-war 
governance capabilities. Participation in the Pacific War demonstrated that the peoples of 
these small islands were not just passive recipients of foreign rule. Native political leaders 
were not simply underdeveloped; rather, they accepted accommodation for legitimizing a 
foreign administration.116 This transactional form of political participation would be a 
model for future interactions with U.S. forces.  
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D. GUAM, A TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
Guam, like its neighboring Mariana Islands and Okinawa, also existed under 
foreign rule prior to World War II. Unlike its neighboring islands, however, Guam became 
subject to explicit U.S. military control long before the upheavals of World War II. This 
civil-military foundation enabled fiat politics to dictate base outcomes. While living under 
U.S. Naval Civil Administration, though, Guamanians politically, linguistically, and 
religiously embraced America. In so doing, the pre-war U.S. military government sowed 
the seeds for social and political integration after the war. In the years to follow, this 
growing American identity would redirect the trajectory of base politics on Guam.  
The United States Navy seized the island of Guam from Spain during the Spanish-
American War in 1898. On 20 June, the USS Charleston arrived off the coast of Guam and 
fired 13 cannon shells at Fort Santa Cruz in Apra Harbor for four minutes.117 That night, 
Captain Henry Glass of the USS Charleston forced the Spanish Governor to surrender the 
island and submit to American authority.118 In one day, a U.S. naval officer captured an 
island for which the Spanish had fought a 28-year war that killed more than 90 percent of 
the native Chamorro population.119 President McKinley’s inaugural instructions to the 
naval administration were to assure “the full measure of individual rights and liberties 
which is the heritage of free peoples.”120 The high hopes of the new administration, 
however, would only fitfully come to fruition. 
The Naval Civil Government established an authoritarian system to govern the 
island’s population. A U.S. Navy officer served as both the naval governor and the 
commandant of Naval Station Guam.121 Although the naval administration retained 
Spain’s system of municipal government, the Naval Governor dismissed local elections 
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and instead appointed officials.122 The island’s only elected body, a “people’s congress,” 
only could advise the Naval Civil Government.123 Furthermore, the naval administration 
retained absolute legal authority over the civilian population. Guamanians had no rights to 
trial by jury or appeal to a higher court.124 At the municipal level, the Marine Corps Insular 
Patrol supplanted local civil police to maintain law and order.125 Thus the naval 
administration’s early institutions failed to meet the executive branch’s noble guidance. 
Although transferring sovereignty from one colonial power to another, the people 
of Guam did not readily accept a loss of individual rights or representation. In 1901, 32 
prominent Guamanian leaders petitioned the U.S. Congress to remove the “military 
government of occupation” and address the circumstances that led to “fewer permanent 
guarantees of liberty and property rights that exist now than under Spanish domain.”126 
This Chamorro advocacy set a precedent for successive rights movements. 
In the following years, Guamanians repeatedly petitioned the U.S. government for 
increased autonomy, equal representation, and citizenship. In 1927, Guamanians attempted 
to simultaneously gain citizenship with the people of the U.S. Virgin Islands, but were 
defeated in Congress.127 A sympathetic naval governor, Captain Willis W. Bradley, 
unilaterally enacted a Guam Bill of Rights in December 1930 that established habeas 
corpus equal voting rights in local elections.128 Buoyed by Captain Bradley’s advocacy, 
2,000 Guamanians again petitioned Congress for citizenship in 1933, but were again 
denied.129 Baltazar J. Bordallo and Franciso B. Leon Guerrero, members of the Guam 
Congress, traveled to Washington, DC, in 1936 to advocate for Guamanian rights. Senator 
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Millard Tydings, Chair of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and a co-
sponsor of the Tydings-McDuffy Act that established Filipino independence, subsequently 
proposed citizenship for Guamanians in 1937.130 Again, however, the U.S. Navy trumped 
the citizenship movement. 
Despite rejecting Guamanian calls for citizenship, the U.S. Naval Civil 
Government increasingly promoted an American identity for the island’s inhabitants. 
Schools were the primary vessel to float this new identity. The administration prohibited 
the native Chamorro language from being taught or spoken in schools.131 By 1940, nearly 
75 percent of Guamanians over the age of ten spoke English.132  
The U.S. also controlled religion in order to promote an American identity. 
Beginning in 1937, the naval administration replaced Catholic Spanish priests with 
American priests, and by 1941 only two of the island’s 14 priests were Spanish.133 In 1938, 
the U.S. Navy restricted all foreign vessels from entering Guam, which further isolated the 
island from economic development, international trade, and travel.134  
Although Guamanians yearned for autonomy under foreign rule, the U.S. naval 
administration also improved the lives of many residents. The U.S. Naval Civil 
Administration concentrated its efforts on improving public health and, as a result, the 
island’s death rate decreased from 2.78 percent in 1905 to 1.17 percent in 1940.135 
Accordingly, the Chamorro population on Guam increased from 9,360 in 1901 to 21,502 
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in 1940.136 This equated to a 129.7 percent increase in indigenous population over 40 
years. By 1940, a total of 23,067 people inhabited the island.137  
As with its neighboring Pacific islands, Guam was the subject of debate over a pre-
war buildup of military assets. The military increased its landholdings by 30 percent since 
1899, and controlled nearly a third of Guam’s total land by 1941.138 Although Admiral 
Alfred Thayer Mahan once declared that Guam ought to be the “Gibraltar of the Pacific,” 
the United States did not resource the outpost to meet the theorist’s ideals.139 After Rear 
Admiral Arthur Hepburn advocated for a strengthened chain of naval bases around the 
world in 1938, the U.S. Navy sought $5,000,000 from Congress to develop an air and 
submarine base on Guam.140 U.S. war plans of 1939 – 1940 categorized Guam as an 
indefensible territory, the lowest priority for resources.141 Accordingly, Congress only 
appropriated $4,700,000 in 1941 to improve Guam’s defenses.142  
Unlike its Japanese neighbors, local conscription in the armed forces decreased in 
1937 when the Guam Militia was disbanded due to budget cuts.143 By April 1941 the 
island’s entire garrison consisted of merely 698 personnel, of which only approximately 
340 were combat forces.144 This military force represented 3.02 percent of the island’s 
population as counted in 1940. Of the five naval vessels based in Apra Harbor in 1941, 
only four were seaworthy, and only three were combat vessels.145 The USS Penguin, a 
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World War I minesweeper, was the largest of the combat vessels.146 In December 1941 
nearly seventy American contractors arrived on the island to construct new airfields and 
oil storage tanks, but their work would prove too late.147  
On 10 December 1941, Japan invaded Guam from their bases in neighboring Saipan 
and the Bonin Islands.148 Approximately 5,900 Japanese troops quickly defeated the 153 
U.S. Marines, 271 U.S. Sailors, and 308 Guamanians that defended the island.149 After 
two and a half years of subsequent occupation, Japan constructed two airfields on Guam, 
had been constructing two more, and had reinforced the island to a total of 18,500 troops 
by June 1944.150 On 21 July 1944, however, the first of 39,080 U.S. troops landed on 
Guam to retake the strategic outpost.151 1,769 American service members died during the 
subsequent liberation alongside 11,000 Japanese.152 Between 1941 and 1944, 578 
Guamanians died and another 258 were injured in the war.153 Though numerically small 
in comparison with the wider war, these casualties represent 3.89 percent of the total 
Chamorro population counted in 1940.  
E. CONCLUSION: BASE POLITICS REVISITED 
Although Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam developed under separate pre-
war administrations, the islands shared similar demographics, histories, and environments 
that would shape their post-war outcomes. Acquired in the waning days of imperialism, all 
three island chains existed as more than colonies, but less than fully equal parts of their 
nation. In the following years, authoritarian military governments governed all three 
locations and increasingly coerced support for an oncoming conflict. Japan solidified its 
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possession of Okinawa though political incorporation and cultural assimilation. Okinawans 
and ethnic Japanese subsequently dominated the indigenous populations of the Mariana 
Islands. The indigenous population of Guam increased in size under foreign administration, 
but consistently sought closer identification with the United States.  
These islands contained both active base supporters and protestors, however, and 
did not passively accept foreign occupation. This analysis demonstrates that pre-war Guam, 
Okinawa, and the northern Mariana Islands contained strong elements of pragmatic and 
nationalistic base supporters. The governmental structures of these islands also indicated a 
high propensity for coercion and not compensation. Despite low levels of autonomy, 
though, each island also contained underlying elements of affective politics. In the case of 
Guam and Okinawa, years of assimilation through education, language, and religion 
created a shared identity that strengthened base support. On the northern Mariana Islands, 
an extreme disproportionate demographic of Japanese citizens marginalized local actors 
and effectively created a paradigm of affective politics.  
Yet, following the war, each developed divergent base politics. What changed their 
outcomes? Along with so much else, the Pacific War altered the trajectory of Guam, the 
northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. More specifically, the manner in which U.S. 
forces administered these islands in the wake of the war proved to be a catalyst for their 
change in base politics. U.S. military governments supplanted Japanese administrations, 
revamped the institutions that governed base politics, and uncovered popular sentiments 
that would redefine the political trajectory of each population. The next chapter analyzes 
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III. THE CATALYST: U.S. NAVY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 
THE PACIFIC 
The war was a catalyst that redefined the base politics of the northern Mariana 
Islands, Guam, and Okinawa. As Calder noted, these catalysts can be “political 
earthquakes” that unleash popular sentiments and affect the outcomes of base politics.154 
Furthermore, Calder argued that local actors are often “the most visible and volatile 
element” in base politics.155 With a population demographically weighted with Japanese 
citizens, the northern Mariana Islands of 1944 would seem to support Calder’s occupation 
hypothesis. As U.S. forces consolidated on the relatively small islands, occupation 
hypothesis suggests that these Japanese-assimilated populations would have resisted 
occupying forces. On Guam of 1944, Calder’s colonization hypothesis similarly suggests 
that decades of military government by the U.S. Navy would have turned the local 
population against returning U.S. forces. Given decades of assimilation with Japan, 
occupation hypothesis predicts that Okinawans would have opposed U.S. bases on the 
island. Furthermore, colonization hypothesis also suggests that Okinawans would have 
rejected any attempts to reintegrate with Japan.  
In the wake of the assault forces, U.S. military governments occupied the political 
vacuum on the islands of the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa. In all three locations, 
U.S. military governments centralized authority and controlled local populations in ways 
that were equally or more demanding than their pre-war counterparts. Given such 
conditions, how did U.S. military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and 
Okinawa affect local base politics to facilitate the long-term basing of U.S. forces? 
First, the U.S. military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa 
reaped widespread affection for their humanitarian relief efforts immediately following 
battle. The destructiveness of these battles increased the necessity and appreciation of this 
aid. Even amongst Japanese populations and former possessions, this relief effort led U.S. 
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forces to be perceived as liberators and not occupiers. These perceptions forestalled the 
resistance predicted by Calder’s occupation hypothesis.  
Second, military governments immediately established their authority as the 
legitimate governing, legal, and social body on the islands. While U.S. military 
governments strictly retained political authority on all three locations, these forces did not 
simply repress popular sentiments to control outcomes. Rather, U.S. military governments 
in the Pacific engineered political and social “legitimating procedures” to generate support 
for bases.156 By coopting existing political structures and controlling demographics, 
military governments deftly navigated historic grievances in base politics, even as 
population densities and military land use skyrocketed to unprecedented levels.  
As military government continued in duration, however, historical grievances 
resurfaced. New pragmatic, ideological, and even nationalist tensions also developed. In 
responding to these tensions, military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and 
Okinawa established institutions and precedents that affected the long-term nature of base 
politics in each location. As Calder observed, “although it is ultimately individuals that 
really act, in both domestic and international politics, they act in institutional contexts.”157 
Calder also noted that, “institutions, although they have multiple origins in the interplay of 
economic, political, and social forces, tend to be profoundly shaped by national historical-
political forces.”158 While the previous chapter described the heritage of political and 
social forces on these islands, this chapter will examine how U.S. military governments, 
individuals, and institutions interacted to affect the local level of base politics. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
World War II marked the U.S. military’s first attempt to educate dedicated civil 
affairs forces for military government.159 Before analyzing how U.S. military government 
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units affected base politics in the Pacific, however, we must first establish the intended 
purpose of these forces and the manner in which they were prepared for their duties. This 
section demonstrates that training and developing civil affairs personnel was a vast effort 
by the U.S. military. By mobilizing end enlisting academic expertise in the base politics of 
the post-war Pacific, the U.S. Navy consolidated the accomplishments of the war and 
established the foundation for long-term security agreements.  
In July 1940, the War Department published Field Manual (FM) 27–5, Military 
Government, which outlined the basic precepts of U.S. military governments.160 As the 
first doctrinal publication to govern civil affairs in the U.S. military, the manual defined 
key terms, roles, and objectives. FM 27-5 defined “military government” itself as the 
authority exercised by military forces over occupied or liberated territories.161 The manual 
deemed “civil affairs control,” the supervision of civil activities by military forces, as an 
essential aspect of military government. Civil affairs control consisted of practical 
activities such as maintaining order, facilitating military operations, and employing local 
resources to further United States interests.162 To conduct these activities, the manual 
designated “civil affairs officers” in the armed forces to control civilians under the direction 
of the military governor.163  
In 1943, FM 27-5 was revised to govern both Army and Navy civil affairs forces. 
In so doing, the U.S. armed forces established its first joint doctrinal approach to the 
challenge of military government. U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government 
and Civil Affairs would serve as the doctrinal point of reference for all U.S. civil affairs 
forces on Okinawa. Using the manual as a doctrinal reference, the Army and the Navy 
successfully engaged American academic institutions to prepare for the challenges of 
military government in liberated and occupied areas.  
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The School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville on 11 May 1942 in order to train the Army’s civil affairs officers. 
Curriculum for the new course consisted of an overview of the U.S. military, historical 
cases of military governance, and civil-military considerations.164 Japanese language was 
not initially taught, as the War Department prioritized the Mediterranean and European 
Theaters of Operation.165 The first course at the School of Military Government consisted 
of 50 officers, the second of 115 officers, and the third of 133 officers.166 
The Department of the Navy also recognized the coming need for military 
governors and found willing instructors at Columbia University. In March 1942, faculty 
members formed a committee and petitioned Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, 
Dr. Joseph Barker, to teach a course in Asian and Pacific languages, cultures, and 
governance on behalf of the war effort. Dr. Barker, who was a former Columbia dean, 
favorably endorsed the proposal. On 9 June 1942, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Frederick Horne directed the civil affairs course at Columbia University to proceed. On 17 
August 1942, 10 days after the 1st Marine Division landed at Guadalcanal, the first course 
at Columbia University convened with 57 officers and Naval Reserve Officer Training 
Corps cadets.167  
In March 1943, the Army and Navy harnessed the power of American academia to 
address the projected shortfall in educated civil affairs officers. The military authorized 
three-month civil affairs courses to be taught at 10 civilian universities.168 These 
institutions—Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the 
University of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve 
College, and the University of Pittsburgh—constituted the Civil Affairs Training Schools 
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(CATS).169 Unlike their counterparts in Columbia and Charlottesville, the CATS trained 
junior civil affairs personnel who were expected to be in regular contact with occupied 
populations.170 Accordingly, instruction focused on practical matters such as language 
proficiency, local government organization, public health practices, and judicial systems 
to be employed in areas likely to be occupied.171 Like Columbia and Charlottesville, the 
CATS were slow to focus on the Pacific Theater of Operations, but five schools eventually 
instructed East Asian civil affairs courses. In a process that rivaled U.S. wartime assembly 
lines, the CATS educated 450 Army and Navy civil affairs personnel each month.172 
The Department of the Navy also recognized the unique capabilities of civilian 
academics early in the U.S. war effort. In April 1943, the Navy took ownership of an 
anthropological study of the Japanese mandated islands that was initiated at Yale 
University in July 1937.173 Yale professors George Murdock, Clellan Ford, and John 
Whiting, who led the study, were subsequently commissioned as officers in the U.S. Navy 
Reserve and assigned to the military government school at Colombia.174 These scholars 
produced, amongst others, the Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, 
published 15 November 1944.175 The handbook, “designed primarily for the use of Army 
and Navy commanders and their staffs and subordinates who may be concerned with 
military government and the control of civil affairs,” exhaustively detailed all dimensions 
of Okinawa: geography, natural resources, history, people, customs, organized groups, 
government, law and justice, public safety, public welfare, health and sanitation, education 
and propaganda, public utilities, transportation, food production, industry, labor, property 
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laws, and finance.176 The Handbook was the most comprehensive U.S. study of Okinawa 
prior to 1945, and served as a reference for students of the Columbia military government 
school. The handbook, and similar editions specific to anticipated battlegrounds, informed 
and guided the actions of civil affairs officers engaged in local base politics around the 
world. 
As civil affairs officers prepared in the United States, the U.S. Navy gained 
practical experience in military government across the Pacific. Throughout 1943 and 1944, 
military government teams landed on the former Mandated Islands to establish U.S. control 
of the population. Navy military government teams had three primary functions in 
Micronesia: “reduction of active and passive sabotage,” “implementation of policies,” and 
“restoration of civilian living conditions to normal.”177 The “implementation of policies” 
implied military policies until political guidance was received. In the Pacific, this translated 
to exclusive, indefinite U.S. control. 
As these battles were being fought, Navy and Marine Corps military government 
teams established authority and control over the indigenous population. Admiral Chester 
Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), established command relationships for military government that 
would be employed largely unchanged throughout the rest of the war. Island and Atoll 
Commanders assumed control of the population after the assault phase and essentially 
served as mayors. In turn, these mayors reported directly to Admiral Nimitz in his capacity 
as Military Governor.178  
In a pattern that would be repeated in future operations, teams posted Proclamation 
Number One, which established Admiral Nimitz’s authority as military governor, and 
Proclamation Number Two, which established the rules of military government.179 
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Subsequent announcements followed, but wherever possible, military government teams 
located and coopted existing indigenous political and social structures to facilitate their 
wartime objectives.180 These islands were subsequently developed into critical bases to 
support the continued offensive against the Japanese. Concurrently with the military 
development, military government teams developed public health, public safety, medical, 
and economic capabilities in the islands.181 These measures proved effective in 
establishing civilian control. At no time during the war did any Marshallese islander under 
U.S. military government commit a major crime against U.S. forces.182 
By 1944 both the Army and the Navy possessed the doctrine, organization, 
education, and experience to administer military governments abroad. Between September 
to December 1943 alone, the School of Military Government and CATS educated 2,000 
civil affairs personnel.183 By March 1945, the U.S. Navy educated 1,333 officers and 
nearly 300 U.S. Army officers at the civil affairs school at Columbia University and an 
additional school opened at Princeton University.184 These civil affairs officers, and 
several scholars themselves, would serve as the planners, administrators, judges, 
economists, and civil engineers in the political battles across the Pacific. 
B. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON THE MARIANA ISLANDS 
In the Civil Affairs Handbook, Japanese Mandated Islands of April 1944 assessed 
that “native political heads were shorn of much of their authority, and complete pacification 
was achieved.”185 As discussed in the previous chapter, Imperial Japanese administration 
dominated the geographic, demographic, and political landscape of the Mariana Islands, 
but Chamorro and other indigenous leaders actively cooperated with their foreign rulers. 
Calder’s occupation hypothesis would have predicted that the local population, after years 
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of social and political assimilation with Japan, would have resisted U.S. military bases and 
forces. How then, did the war and subsequent military government change the population’s 
interactions with foreign forces based on the island?  
The U.S. Navy military government rapidly established authority and legitimacy 
on the northern Mariana Islands, then employed many similar methods to control the 
population as had the Japanese. U.S. military government altered the demographics of the 
island as dramatically as the Japanese administration and similarly controlled social 
institutions through education and religion. In doing so, the U.S. military government 
established a narrative of political and social separation from the Japanese administration 
that facilitated U.S. military basing interests. The main difference between American and 
Japanese rule, however, was the way in which the United States administered the island. 
These early military government initiatives shaped base politics on the northern Mariana 
Islands for years to follow. 
After successive operations across Micronesia in 1943 and 1944, Navy military 
government teams encountered their most difficult civil-military challenge in the northern 
Mariana Islands. These islands were the most heavily populated of the Mandated Islands, 
and also contained the largest percentage of Japanese nationals anywhere in Micronesia.186 
The battles to capture the islands were costly, and also witnessed large number of Japanese 
suicides. An estimated 30,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed in the battle.187 
Into this environment, Navy military government teams landed to establish U.S. control 
and govern the population. 
Military government established on Saipan on 19 June 1944, four days after the 
initial landings. The teams found more than 1,000 civilian refugees already under control 
of the assault divisions.188 To control and care for these civilians, military government 
teams established Camp Susupe near the landing beaches. On neighboring Tinian, Marine 
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Corps civil affairs teams established military government on 30 July 1944, six days after 
the initial landing.189 By 31 August 1944, military government teams controlled 10,639 
civilians in Camp Churo.190 These high numbers of civilians were compounded by the fact 
that civilians in the Marianas were unable to evacuate to Japan due to the constricting allied 
war on merchant shipping.191 Against this problem, 25 officers and 130 enlisted men 
served in the military government section of Saipan, while 23 officers and 70 men served 
on Tinian in September 1944. The number of personnel under military government in the 
northern Mariana Islands exceeded anything the Navy had experienced up to that point in 
the war. Indeed, the size of the Navy military government operation in the Mariana Islands 
was only later overshadowed by the forthcoming operations on Okinawa and the main 
islands of Japan. 
The challenges of military government continued long after the assault phase 
concluded. Furthermore, military government controlled and cared for Japanese nationals 
for the first time. In August 1945, 18,390 civilians still inhabited Camp Susupe on Saipan, 
of which 13,506 were Japanese, 1,386 Korean, 2,660 Chamorro, and 838 other indigenous 
islanders.192 That same month, 11,465 civilians inhabited Camp Churo on Tinian, of which 
9,090 were Japanese and 2,371 Korean, and 4 Chinese.193 There were no indigenous 
people on Tinian, as the Japanese administration had evacuated all ethnic Chamorro from 
the island to Saipan prior to the battles. As one U.S. Navy civil affairs officer observed of 
the internees, “the Japanese civilians are greatly relieved that the propaganda about the way 
we would treat them has proved to be entirely false,” but “this does not mean that any 
gratitude which they may feel towards us should be interpreted as affection.”194  
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To help control the civilian population, military government recruited police forces 
from within the camps. Organized along ethnic lines, these provisional forces only policed 
their respective ethnic communities. Proportionally, the local police also represented a 
larger segment of the indigenous population than under the Japanese administration. On 
Saipan, 103 Chamorro and Carolinian men constituted the “Camp Susupe Police” by 
August 1945.195 A corresponding 76 Japanese and 19 Koreans policed their respective 
populations.196 This nearly equal ratio of native to foreign police officers was quite the 
reversal from the mandate era, when ethnic Japanese outnumbered Chamorro by a 2:1 ratio 
in the police forces. The figure is even more striking when considering that the ratio of 
ethnic Japanese to the indigenous population on Saipan was 4:1 in August 1945. As in the 
Japanese mandate era, service in the police was an important gateway to participation in 
the foreign administration. In the U.S. military government, however, the gateway was 
much larger for indigenous persons.  
The legitimacy and control established by the U.S. military government yielded 
immediate benefits. Saipan and Tinian became the site of some of the largest and most 
important U.S. military bases during the Pacific War. Two major airfields were developed 
on Tinian and housed approximately 200 B-29 bombers and 17,000 associated crew.197 
On Saipan, an additional airfield was improved and housed another wing of approximately 
100 bombers and 8,500 crew members.198 The U.S. airfields on Tinian were so secure that 
the U.S. Army Air Force chose that location to base the bombers that delivered the nuclear 
weapons to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No major acts of sabotage or subversion occurred in 
the northern Marina Islands during the war.199  
As the prospect of long-term administration increased, the Navy military 
government proceeded with the comprehensive health, safety, political, financial, and 
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economic initiatives that engendered U.S. support in other liberated areas of the Pacific. 
Admiral Raymond Spruance, succeeding Admiral Nimitz as CINCPAC, issued a new, 
more optimistic directive for the administration of former Japanese islands on 12 December 
1945.200 This directive, which came to be known informally as the “Pacific Charter,” 
established new guidelines for the political, social, and economic development of the 
populations under U.S. Navy administration.201 Admiral Spruance’s “Pacific Charter” 
would serve as the foundation for civil-military relations in the post-war Mariana Islands. 
Admiral Spruance’s directive also facilitated the kind of social assimilation that 
U.S. Navy military government employed on Guam before the war. Although initially 
intended to altruistically develop future generations on the administered islands, education 
proved to be a primary means to Americanize the population. As Admiral Spruance 
decreed, “instruction in English language is a prime necessity but this is not to be construed 
as discouraging instruction in native languages or cultures.”202 By May 1947, 1,193 
students in the Saipan District, including 200 adults and 11 teachers in training, attended 
school for five hours a day, five days a week, for eight months of the year.203 The Navy 
also encouraged children to participate in the Boy Scouts of America after school.204 The 
students educated in the U.S. system would later serve as the medical professionals, police, 
bureaucrats, and politicians of an increasingly autonomous northern Mariana Islands. 
Religion was another social institution that shaped the identities of the population 
of the northern Marianas. The majority of the indigenous pre-war population of Saipan and 
Tinian were Catholics, due to proselytization under Spanish rule.205 In June 1946, the U.S. 
naval administration facilitated the Catholic Church’s mission by allowing the first 
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American priest to return to Saipan. By August 1946, 10 Catholic missionaries were either 
on or travelling to Saipan.206 Furthermore, the Marianas Vicariate was established on 
Guam in September 1946. The reinvigorated church oversaw the 4,222 Catholics of the 
post-war indigenous population on Saipan.207 The U.S. naval administration made no 
similar provisions to promote Shinto, other than local practices by internees in Camp 
Susupe and Camp Churo.  
Most significantly, the “Pacific Charter” decreed that indigenous peoples should be 
“granted the highest degree of self-government that they are capable of assimilating,” and 
that administrative structures “should be patterned on the politico-social institutions which 
the inhabitants have evolved for themselves.”208 While this directive accommodated 
regional differences in history and development, it also implied that indigenous societies 
were not yet advanced enough to manage democratic governance. Local leaders, however, 
soon demonstrated their aptitude for such a government.  
The indigenous population of Saipan developed a sophisticated system of 
representative government at the municipal level.209 Established by charter on 1 July 1947, 
all persons over the age of 18 directly elected a precinct-level representative to a one-year 
term and a chief commissioner to a four-year term.210 Each of the eleven elected precinct 
representatives formed a high council, which convened weekly and advised the U.S. 
military government. With the concurrence of the high council, the chief commissioner 
appointed a treasurer, education officer, and health officer to advise the legislative body.211 
The rest of the Saipan District, which encompassed the islands of Tinian, Rota, Alamagan 
and Agrihan, also adopted similar systems.212 Despite years of demographic domination 
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under the Japanese, indigenous leaders of the northern Mariana Islands demonstrated their 
capability for democratic governance.  
A pendulum swing in demographics also reversed the trend of foreign domination 
experienced during the war. The low population density of Saipan, which at 39 people per 
square mile equaled that of Vermont, avoided tensions between U.S. forces and the local 
population.213 Furthermore, the U.S. administration revoked Japan’s claim to government-
owned land on the islands, which provided a boon for prospective local landholders.214 
Thus, civil-military contact did not have a significant effect on base politics on the northern 
Mariana Islands. 
The social and political initiatives implemented by the U.S. military government, 
combined with demographic shifts equal in magnitude to those in the Japanese era, 
revamped the civil-military dynamic and effectively nullified the effects of Calder’s 
occupation hypothesis. Instead, military government created the conditions conducive to 
viewing U.S. forces as a liberating occupation. The decrease in the number and scope of 
U.S. military forces after the war also created opportunities for increased indigenous 
political participation. As years of socialization accumulated, inhabitants of the northern 
Mariana Islands internalized their American identity and sought closer ties to the United 
States. These social effects would define the civil-military relations of the northern Mariana 
Islands.  
C. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON GUAM 
With more than four decades of experience governing Guam, the U.S. Navy felt 
relatively well prepared to administer the island after liberation. Civil affairs officers 
created no handbook to specifically describe Guam, but as the Civil Affairs Handbook for 
the Mandated Mariana Islands declared, “the United States Navy, which has been charged 
with the administration of Guam, is well apprised of the situation in that island.”215 In a 
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sign of its confidence, the U.S. Navy largely reestablished the governing institutions that 
existed before the war. After years of U.S. Navy military government rule, however, 
Calder’s occupation hypothesis predicts that the local population would have resisted U.S. 
military bases and forces. How did the returning military government actually affect the 
base politics of Guam? 
Although initially gaining widespread support after the liberation of the island, the 
U.S. military allowed tensions to build amongst pragmatic and ideological actors in the 
island’s base politics. The authoritarian nature of the military administration failed to 
reconcile with the Americanized population of Guam that embraced ideas of individual 
rights, legal representation, and self-governance. The governing structures re-imposed 
following the war failed to accommodate the power of these ideas that were generated 
under pre-war U.S. Navy administration. Meanwhile, the centralization of authority in the 
hands of the military governor facilitated control of the population, but also enabled 
significant institutional changes depending on the decisions of individual governors. In the 
post-war military government era, a confluence of individual actors, local institutions, and 
domestic politics created a new environment of Guamanian base politics.  
The U.S. military returned to Guam on 21 July 1944 and liberated the islands in a 
costly three-week battle. Landing with the assault forces, military government teams on 
Guam soon uncovered pockets of Chamorro civilians sheltered from the battle. Prior to the 
battle, the commander of the Japanese garrison evacuated all Chamorro civilians to the 
relatively unoccupied southern half of the island.216 As combat units discovered civilians, 
they directed them rearwards to civil affairs personnel and eventually to two temporary 
camps established at Asan and Finile, near Agat.217 Civil affairs personnel then triaged 
and addressed the most immediate health and sustenance needs. While these acts 
undoubtedly saved many civilian lives during the battle, they also dissociated many 
Guamanians from their lands. By the time the island was declared secure on 10 August 
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1944, U.S. military government was caring for approximately 18,000 Chamorro 
civilians.218 
The U.S. military quickly developed Guam, along with neighboring Tinian and 
Saipan, to fulfill its role as a base of operations. Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander 
Marianas Area, reclaimed Apra Harbor, adjacent Orote Peninsula, and the neighboring 
village of Sumay for use as a naval base and airfield.219 In February 1945, Admiral Nimitz 
established his forward headquarters on Guam, overlooking the assault beaches of 
Asan.220 Like recently captured Saipan and Tinian, naval construction battalions also 
developed Guam for B-29 operations. The first bombers began flying from Northwest Field 
by February 1945, and North Field was operational by June 1945.221 In total, the United 
States planned to base 500 bombers and 45,000 personnel of the Twentieth Air Force on 
Guam, Tinian, and Saipan during the war.222 Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval 
operations, declared that the Mariana Islands were the “key to the Pacific War.”223 
The Military Government of Guam, established in October 1944, thus had the 
responsibility of administering the population in order to control the “key to the 
Pacific.”224 The newly established administration, led by Marine Major General Henry L. 
Larsen, first tackled the problem of housing and land usage. The war destroyed 
approximately 80 percent of the 3,286 pre-war domiciles on Guam.225 To rectify this 
shortage, and to ease the burden on the administration, the military government constructed 
more than 1,400 homes by September 1945.226 Local Chamorro also built an additional 
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1,500 houses.227 The Military Government of Guam still housed approximately 5,000 
Chamorro by middle of 1945, though, as the Navy forbade resettlement of Sumay and 
Agana, two of the largest population centers of pre-war Guam.228 This amounted to nearly 
a quarter of the pre-war Chamorro population. 
Applying Calder’s contact hypothesis, the sheer number of people on Guam in the 
early postwar years would suggest increased civil-military tensions. By the end of the war, 
201,718 U.S. service members occupied Guam.229 Combined with an estimated civilian 
population of 21,838, the total population density of Guam was 1,045 people per square 
mile in August 1945.230 Although the total military population on Guam declined to 
approximately 29,000 by the end of 1946, Guam’s population density remained relatively 
high for the Pacific islands.231 With 203 square miles of land, the total population density 
of Guam at the end of 1946 equated to 250 people per square mile.  
To fulfill the obligations incurred by military demands during the war, the Military 
Government of Guam implemented an array of social initiatives. As in the northern 
Mariana Islands, the administration employed education and religion to occupy the 
population. In 1945, 167 Chamorro teachers instructed more than 7,000 students daily in 
21 schools across the island.232 The administration also rebuilt 17 churches on Guam, and 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, accommodated the Catholic Marianas Vicariate in 
September 1946.233 Through these early humanitarian and social initiatives, the military 
government established legitimacy and earned the good will of the population. 
In May 1946, however, the military government took a new course. Along with a 
broader reorganization of forces in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Charles Pownall, commander 
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Navy Forces Marianas, relieved the Military Government of Guam and established the 
Navy Island Government.234 Rear Admiral Pownall commanded Naval Air Forces, Pacific 
during the war, and senior Navy leadership viewed Admiral Pownall as an ideal candidate 
to develop Guam into a strategic air base in the post-war Western Pacific.235 Under the 
authority of Admiral Pownall, Guam and its inhabitants would undertake some of the most 
significant civil-military developments in its history.  
As the administration continued, the initial goodwill that was engendered by the 
liberation and social programs faded. Under Admiral Pownall, the U.S. military 
government established the City Planning Commission and the Land and Claims 
Commission to appropriate and develop land on Guam for military purposes.236 
Commander A. L. O’Bannon, head of the Land and Claims Commission, made clear to 
Guamanians that the Navy would determine “who goes back where, how they go back, 
how fast they go, and on what lots they go back.”237 To facilitate new base construction, 
the Navy administration also enacted a new “off-limits policy” to prevent locals from 
accessing lands to be developed.238 This policy led to Guamanian families losing an 
additional 1,350 homes by 1947.239  
Land ownership became an increasing source of tension between the local 
population and the military government. By 1948 the U.S. military controlled 56,500 acres, 
or approximately 88.3 square miles, of land on Guam.240 This accounted for nearly 42 
percent of all land on Guam.241 Compounding the land problem, Guamanians were 
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initially not legally entitled to contest the acquisition of their lands.242 And as families, not 
individuals, historically owned land on Guam, this lack of due process affected 
Guamanians exponentially.243 The lack of legitimating legal procedures to contest land 
claims led Guamanians to increasingly view the Navy Island Government as a non-
liberating occupation. 
Legal mechanisms to compensate Guamanians were equally lackluster. Although 
the U.S. Congress enacted the Guam Meritorious Claims Act of 1945 to compensate locals 
affected by the war, the Navy Island Government depressed payments to a maximum of 
$5,000 per lost property in order to reduce administrative budgets.244 This policy had the 
unintended consequence of disproportionately affecting large landholders on Guam, which 
included many political elites such as the Bordallo family.245 Exacerbating these 
limitations, the U.S. Navy paid only 190 of 1,519 Guamanian rent claims by June 1947.246 
Even then, the military government calculated these rates at 1941 levels of property value, 
despite land increasing in value by an estimated 100 percent after the war.247 These 
pragmatic grievances reinforced Guamanians’ ideological desire for increased political 
participation.  
The limits on political participation imposed by the reinstated Navy Island 
Government accelerated ideological base protests. Although the Guam Congress 
reconvened in the same format as before the war, military government still granted the 
island’s sole representative body no legislative authority.248 Legally, Guamanians had no 
recourse to appeal military government decrees beyond the military governor.249 And 
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while Guamanians lived in an unincorporated territory, they were not foreign citizens 
eligible for U.S. citizenship. Thus they were caught in a citizenship loophole. Guamanians 
could only obtain U.S. citizenship through military service, as established in the Nationality 
Act of 1940. Approximately 600 Guamanians earned their U.S. citizenship in this 
manner.250 With increased military demands and few corresponding avenues for recourse, 
pragmatic and ideological actors appealed to the Navy Island Government. Guamanian 
Congressmen Baltazar Bordallo and Francisco Leon Guerrero resumed their pre-war 
citizenship movement and also demanded territorial status for the island.251  
To address these concerns, the Secretary of the Navy granted legislative powers to 
the Guam Congress on 7 August 1947.252 Under the new system the Guam Congress 
established budgets, and its legislation carried the force of law; but Admiral Pownall 
retained veto authority subject to overrule by a two-thirds majority in the Guam 
Congress.253 In the case of an overruled veto, the Secretary of the Navy would determine 
the final resolution of the bill.254 In practice, however, the Secretary of the Navy aligned 
with Admiral Pownall on most decisions.255 Guamanians remained unsatisfied, and 
between 1947 and 1949 their advocacy produced 11 additional bills and resolutions for 
citizenship and representation in the Congress.256 Despite local outcry, this system 
continued on Guam until another catalyst changed the national and international 
environment in 1949. 
On Guam, U.S. military government forces initially enjoyed the latitude afforded 
from being perceived as a liberating occupation by the local population. After recapturing 
Guam, the United States Navy resumed administration in a manner similar to the pre-war 
era. As military government continued and demand for land increased, however, the 
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population increasingly came into conflict with the naval administration. Pragmatic base 
protestors advocated for land rights and compensation, while ideological base protestors 
advocated for increased participation in base politics and representation in the federal 
government. Although pragmatic disputes over land continued, Guamanians increasingly 
protested the political status quo on ideological grounds. This dynamic threatened to return 
Guam to an environment of a non-liberating occupation. Only national-level intervention 
would resolve these tensions. 
D. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON OKINAWA 
As in the former Mandated Islands, Calder’s occupation hypothesis would have 
predicted that years of social and political assimilation with Japan would result in resistance 
to U.S. military bases. Additionally, the political repression and the devastation of the war 
suggest that Okinawans would have viewed association with Japan as a vestige of their 
colonial occupation. How did the post-war military government promote base supporters 
to ensure U.S. bases? 
In the 1944 edition of the Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, the 
U.S. Navy ascertained that “the Ryukyu islanders have not become wholly assimilated to 
the culture of the Japanese, by whom they are generally regarded as somewhat uncouth 
rustics.”257 Written by Yale anthropologists George P. Murdock, John M. W. Whiting, and 
Clellan S. Ford, the Civil Affairs Handbook reflected the dual narratives with which 
Americans governed Okinawa.258 While acknowledging significant historical and cultural 
ties to Japan, these civil affairs officers distinguished Okinawans as distinct from the 
Japanese and advocated for their full rights as liberated peoples. Accordingly, the U.S. 
military government ceded social life back to the Okinawan people. Politically, however, 
the military government retained absolute authority to protect U.S. military bases. This 
bifurcated strategy resulted in an occupied population with a distinct heritage that initially 
remained uninfluential in national and international base politics. The nuanced policies 
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implemented by the U.S. military government would affect base politics on Okinawa for 
generations to come.  
Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, provided a new challenge to the U.S. 
military in the Pacific War. With an estimated population of 448,859 as of 1940, Okinawa 
was the largest Japanese population center encountered by the Americans in the Pacific 
War.259 The island was also devastated as a result of the battle between Japanese and 
Allied forces from April to June 1945. In addition to the mass suffering of the population, 
the island’s government, institutions, and infrastructure were destroyed. In the midst of the 
largest amphibious operation of the Pacific War, the U.S. Navy undertook its largest 
military government effort of the war to secure Okinawa as a base for future operations 
against Japan.  
Recognizing that Okinawa would exceed the capacity of each service, Army and 
Navy civil affairs graduates were assigned to the Military Government Section, Tenth 
Army Headquarters for the planning and execution of Operation Iceberg. Developing 
Okinawa into an airbase, anchorage, and staging area would require monumental 
cooperation between the Army and Navy along all lines of effort. The Tenth Army Military 
Government Section was led by veterans of the Allied Military Government in Italy and 
comprised of school-educated Army and Navy civil affairs officers.260 Former Yale 
Professor George Murdock, co-author of the Civil Affairs Handbook, served as a naval 
officer in the Tenth Army Military Government Section. Accordingly, the CINCPOA and 
Tenth Army staffs adhered to the precepts of military government as outlined in Manual 
of Military Government and Civil Affairs and the Handbook for Civil Affairs. Tenth Army 
directed civil affairs officers to employ local law enforcement agencies, adhere to local 
governmental structures, and cooperate with local political leaders to the greatest extent 
possible.261 This policy established a basis for interactions between the U.S. military and 
Okinawans that would last for decades to come.  
 
259 Department of the Navy, 51. 
260 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 18–22. 
261 Fisch, 21. 
56 
U.S. military government detachments initially gained legitimacy with the 
Okinawan population through their humanitarian efforts. Humanitarian aid accounted for 
2,599.9 measurement tons of cargo loaded across the 430 transportation ships of the assault 
wave, with an additional 10,000 measurement tons that arrived each month for the next six 
months.262 These supplies reached Okinawa after a 6,250 nautical mile journey from the 
West Coast of the United States that took nearly 120 days for requisitioning, loading, 
shipping, and unloading.263 By the end of the battle in July, the Tenth Army Logistics 
Section estimated that U.S. forces cared for 295,000 of the island’s population.264 To do 
so, the U.S. Navy imported 59 percent of all foodstuffs consumed by the civilian 
population.265 The entirety of this effort was coordinated by the military government, 
which comprised of 2,879 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in July 1945.266 
As in Guam, however, the increased size of the military population and increased 
demands for land challenged the U.S. military government. The U.S. military government 
relocated approximately 250,000 Okinawans between 1 April and 31 August 1945 in order 
to safeguard them during the battle and subsequently render aid.267 By August 1945, the 
U.S. military also controlled approximately 85 percent of all land on Okinawa.268 
Exacerbating the land problem, 259,000 U.S. troops occupied Okinawa and the Ryukyu 
Islands by the end of the war.269 With 463 square miles of land on Okinawa, the total 
civilian and military population equated to a density of 1,207 people per square mile. 
Excluding military-controlled land, the 320,000 Okinawans under military government 
control in September 1945 had roughly 69 square miles of available land to resettle. If 
 
262 Roy E. Appleman, Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. 
Army, 1948), 36; Fisch, 65. 
263 Appleman, 36. 
264 Appleman, 417. 
265 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 47. 
266 Fisch, 73. 
267 Fisch, 57. 
268 Sarantakes, Keystone, 31. 
269 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 74. 
 
57 
evenly distributed, this would equate to a civilian population density of 4,638 Okinawans 
per square mile. This represented a significant increase from the 1940 population density 
of 901 Okinawans per square mile.270 Thus, the military government faced significant 
challenges when it began resettling Okinawans in October 1945.271 
To help manage these administrative challenges, the military government coopted 
local Okinawan leaders. At the direction of Lieutenant Commander George Murdock, 
former Yale professor and Tenth Army military government planner, an Okinawan 
delegation elected a 15-member Okinawan Advisory Council in August 1945 to assist the 
U.S. administration.272 This Advisory Council, led by the prominent educator Shikiya 
Koshin, assisted the military government in administering cities, towns, and villages as 
Okinawans resettled the island.273 The Advisory Council subsequently established a five-
person land claims committee to document ownership at the village, or mura, level. The 
Council similarly established 10-person committees at the village section, or aza, level.274 
These were the first institutions to re-establish the pre-war Japanese system of land 
ownership on Okinawa.275 
Social developments paralleled political developments. The U.S. military 
government implemented educational initiatives out of necessity rather than in search of 
assimilation. Rampant school-aged children in civilian camps created a discipline problem 
for military government units across the island.276 Thus, in August 1945, military 
government established an Education Section that brought 40,000 Okinawan children into 
school by October 1945.277  
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The education initiative was also an inadvertent step towards Okinawan self-
administration. Although Admiral Spruance’s “Pacific Charter” prohibited the teaching of 
the Japanese language in schools, the military government diverged from this policy for 
practical and ideological reasons. Due to a lack of dual-language teachers and conscious of 
Okinawa’s political uncertainty, military government allowed all Okinawan schools to 
teach in Japanese.278 Furthermore, military government established the Okinawan 
Department of Education on 2 January 1946, to oversee the growing number of schools 
across the island. This was the first Okinawan-led department with full administrative 
authority under the military government. By July 1946 Okinawa returned to pre-war levels 
of education with 133,536 students enrolled in 224 schools.279  
Another significant development followed the creation of the Okinawan 
Department of Education. On 21 September 1945, the U.S. Navy assumed responsibilities 
for military government on Okinawa.280 Rear Admiral John D. Price assumed command 
of Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, and also duties as the Chief Military Government 
Officer. His Deputy Commander for Military Government, Marine Colonel Charles I. 
Murray, administered the island in practice.281 Under Colonel Murray, who served as the 
Deputy Military Government Officer in Guam prior to his assignment on Okinawa, the 
U.S. Navy implemented some of the most significant reforms in Okinawan base 
politics.282 
Under the direction of Colonel Murray, the U.S. Navy continued the ambitious civil 
affairs initiatives started at Columbia University in 1942. Civil affairs officer Lieutenant 
John Caldwell, formerly a professor at Vanderbilt University, devised a bold plan to build 
autonomous Okinawan institutions in order to drive economic development and thus ease 
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the burden on military government.283 The key aspect of this plan was creating self-
administering political bodies that reinforced U.S. governing authority. Lieutenant 
Caldwell’s plan began in September 1945 with direct elections by Okinawans, 25 years or 
older, for councilmen and mayors.284 This was also the first election in Okinawan history 
in which women voted.285 These elections coincided with a restructuring of military 
government that empowered political participation at the village, mura, level, and 
centralized military government oversight.286 These elected councilmen and mayors then 
nominated three individuals to advise the military governor on behalf of all Okinawans.287 
On 24 April 1946, Colonel Murray appointed Koshin Shikiya to serve as the governor, or 
chiji, of Okinawa.288  
Koshin Shikiya’s appointment coincided with a larger restructuring of Okinawan 
political bodies. In his new position, Shikiya reported directly to Colonel Murray as the 
Deputy Commander for Military Government.289 The newly appointed governor headed 
the Central Okinawan Administration, which was created from the recently dissolved 
Okinawan Advisory Council.290 Military government also reconstituted the pre-war 
Prefectural Assembly to advise the chiji and renamed the body the Okinawan Assembly.291 
The Assembly reinstated officials from the last wartime election of 1942, and military 
government appointed individuals to fill the remaining vacancies.292 The 25 members of 
the Okinawan Assembly first convened on 23 May 1946.293 Thus, with a foreign-
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appointed governor and the recently reestablished island-wide assembly, Okinawa’s 
political structure returned to its pre-war form less than one year after the battle for the 
island ended. These structures continued mostly unaltered throughout the remaining years 
of U.S. military government. 
By the time the U.S. Army resumed military government responsibilities on 1 July 
1946, the U.S. Navy significantly reconstructed the political and social landscape of 
Okinawa. Through early and intense humanitarian aid, the military government earned 
legitimacy and respect from the Okinawan population. These efforts shaped Okinawan’s 
initial perception of U.S. forces as liberators rather than occupiers. The U.S. military 
government reinforced these perceptions by avoiding cultural assimilation and 
implementing social initiatives that reinforced Japanese identity. By rehabilitating the 
island’s pre-war political structures, the Americans also encouraged Okinawan prospects 
for political participation. In doing so, military government initially marginalized 
ideological and nationalist base protestors. This left only pragmatic protestors, which 
Calder argued are the “most amenable to policy suasion.”294 These initiatives by the U.S. 
Navy military government set Okinawa on a course for political and social rehabilitation, 
encouraged continued civil-military cooperation, and propagated the U.S. military’s 
strategically advantageous position in local base politics. 
Still, significant challenges remained for Okinawa in summer 1946. Relief, 
relocation, and repatriation efforts brought the total population in the Ryukyu Islands to 
690,160 by June 1946.295 At the same time, the new military government refused to 
consider compensation for the use of Okinawan land.296 As one military government 
officer observed, “housing, the agrarian problem, and the growing population problem 
certainly seem important issues that will have to be dealt with if the United States is going 
to permanently establish itself in the Ryukyus.”297 Indeed, these forces increased tensions 
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in base politics during the years to follow. As strategic indecision regarding Okinawa’s 
future lingered into the 1950s, the problems associated with prolonged occupation 
exceeded military government’s capabilities to resolve them. Thus, national and 
international arrangements would be needed to stabilize base politics on Okinawa. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Navy’s military government teams were the catalyst that implemented policy, 
connected military objectives to strategic goals, and built the civil-military structures that 
governed long-term base politics. Military governments on Saipan, Guam, and Okinawa 
quickly established legitimacy and control through their humanitarian relief efforts in the 
immediate aftermath of battle. The successful execution of this effort resulted from years 
of education, training, and planning by some of the country’s leading experts in their fields. 
For a modest investment in personnel, education, and resources, the Navy military 
governments perpetuated the hard-won victories across the Pacific. 
After the immediate cataclysm passed, military government initiatives redefined 
base politics in each location. On Saipan and Tinian, massive population redistribution, 
social assimilation, and increased political participation changed the environment of base 
politics from that of a non-liberating occupation to a liberating occupation. On Guam, the 
brutality of the Japanese administration and their subsequent expulsion also initially 
created the dynamic of a liberating occupation. Increased competition for land and dashed 
hopes for increased political participation, however, threatened to return base politics to an 
environment of a non-liberating occupation. Okinawa experienced a similar dynamic in 
base politics, although on a delayed timeline compared to Guam. In both Guam and 
Okinawa, local leaders emerged as influential actors in base politics. Tensions over land, 
citizenship, and self-governance remained unresolved at the local level, however. In all 
three locations, these tensions eventually required arbitration at the national and 
international level in order to continue U.S. military basing arrangements.  
To understand the evolution of base politics on the northern Mariana Islands, 
Guam, and Okinawa, we must also understand the national and international context 
surrounding these civil-military relationships. National and international actors not only 
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shaped the base politics of these islands, but local populations and military governments 
similarly affected international outcomes. Understanding the civil-military interactions of 
the military governments only partially explains these outcomes. Thus, the next chapter 
will analyze the outcomes of base politics on the national and international level.  
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IV. COLD WAR BASE POLITICS: A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
The United States held unparalleled power in the Pacific at the end of World War 
II. This power, however, exposed fundamental tensions between American policy makers. 
Military and political leaders disagreed over the disposition of the vast network of military 
bases on islands seized from Japan during the war. One camp, primarily led by military 
leaders, advocated for the annexation of territories seized during the Pacific war and 
permanently establishing military forces as a bulwark against future aggression. Another 
camp, primarily led by diplomats and politicians, advocated for the restrained use of power 
and to uphold the anti-expansionist values championed during the war. These debates often 
occurred in the context of competing foreign policy strategies and larger ideological 
battles.298  Between 1944 and 1951, the United States subsequently established a long-
term military presence in the Western Pacific in order to prevent a resurgent Japan and to 
contain the spread of communism. How did these competing American visions of the 
postwar world affect the outcomes of base politics on Guam, the Mariana Islands, and 
Okinawa? 
Of the many factors that shaped American postwar foreign policy, three 
significantly affected U.S. policy towards its military possessions in the Western Pacific. 
First, simplistic American perceptions about the peoples inhabiting these islands enabled 
American leaders to initially act relatively unencumbered by domestic dissent. As 
American media informed the public on local issues surrounding these overseas bases, 
however, domestic pressure compelled policy makers to respond. Second, strategic 
security concerns arising from the Pacific War motivated the United States military to 
entrench bases in the Western Pacific. Third, the developing Cold War unified political and 
military desires to maintain regional hegemony in East Asia.  
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Local and subnational forces, however, shaped outcome of these national and 
international forces. Limited means forced American policy makers to pursue only the most 
critical locations to base military forces. Unresolved tensions in local base politics 
precipitated action at the national and international level. Ideologies and prominent 
political theories swayed U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the desire for international 
legitimacy shaped the ways in which the United States pursued these aims. Guam, the 
Mariana Islands, and Okinawa, in particular, were chosen for their strategic value, vague 
claims to ownership, and diplomatic expediency.    
A. AMERICAN IMAGES OF THE PACIFIC  
As Thomas Bailey, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, wrote 
about America’s Oceanic possessions in April 1940, “overnight these tiny islets sprang 
from obscurity to the headlines.”  Indeed, the outcropping of atolls and islands strewn 
across the Pacific, once only of interest to whalers and guano harvesters, gained a new 
purpose in the 20th century. In the preface to Uncle Sam’s Pacific Islets, Bailey wrote, 
“with aircraft assuming an increasingly vital place in naval and military strategy, these 
hitherto scorned land dots have before them an exciting – perhaps terrifying – future.”299  
The outbreak of war in the Pacific brought the terrifying version of the future to these 
islands.  
The war also brought an urgent, renewed interest in these Pacific islands to 
Americans from all walks of life. Writing of Micronesia in 1942, Helen Follett described 
“signs on some of the islands – ancient earthworks, walls, and canals – of an old race of 
keen intellect of which today’s people are a poor remnant.”300 On Guam, Follett recounted 
that the “natives have always called themselves ‘Chamorros’ in spite of the fact that the 
pure ‘Chamorro’ really disappeared a long time ago.”301 Instead, Follett depicted school 
children who “saluted the American flag and sang a patriotic song in a confused kind of 
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English,” buoyed by “the marine barracks and the naval hospital that has always taken care 
of the natives.”302   
In 1943, the Smithsonian Institution published a 21-volume series describing the 
history, geography, and society of locations sprung from obscurity to the headlines by the 
war. The series was so popular that its print run was increased from 3500 to 8000 copies, 
with the Army and Navy purchasing a significant amount for its service members.303  
Volume 16, written by Herbert Krieger, the U.S. National Museum Curator for the Division 
of Ethnography, described the peoples of the Western Pacific.304 In pre-war Guam, 
Krieger depicted a society where “a pleasing form of native Chamorro-Filipino-American 
civilization came into being, with Americanisms in the ascendancy.”305   
Americans knew even less about Saipan, Okinawa, or any of the other outlying 
islands under Japanese control. With Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 
1933, Japan closed these island possessions to foreigners. Walter Harris, one of the last 
Americans to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands in 1932, wrote in Foreign Affairs that 
“the natives of the islands vary in character as they vary in appearance, but as a general 
statement they may be described as docile, law-abiding, thriftless, and idle.”306 Harris 
concluded that “the natives have no past and will have no future.”307 Only through invasion 
and occupation would Americans learn of the peoples inhabiting these former Japanese 
outposts. 
The war not only transformed these islands themselves, but American perceptions 
of the islands. As Follett asked, “Islands – what does that word mean in 1942?  Romance, 
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adventure, an escape for world-weary people? Can an island anywhere ever again feel safe 
in its isolation?” Follett concluded, “sentries on guard – that is what islands are 
today…today when the farthest outposts of the United States have become so vital these 
small stepping-stone islands have taken on an heroic importance of their own.”308  Krieger 
lamented in 1943, “it is to be regretted now that all 17 of the Marianas as well as the 
Carolines were not taken by the United States in 1898.”309 These perceptions of the Pacific 
islands as romantic yet remote, simple yet strategic, shaped U.S. foreign policy in the years 
to come.  
While these accounts by no means comprehensively capture American public 
opinion, they indicate Americans’ growing concern for these Pacific islands. By May 1944, 
69 percent of Americans supported some sort of permanent U.S. control over the islands 
seized in the war, while only 17 percent opposed.310 Writing for Far Eastern Survey in 
November 1945, Eleanor Lattimore asked if U.S. military bases in the Marianas, Ryukyus 
and elsewhere would result in a “Pacific Ocean or American Lake?”311 “The means by 
which the bases are acquired and held,” Lattimore declared, “is the legitimate concern of 
the average citizen, because here not only naval and military but political questions are 
involved – questions of precedent and our relations with other nations and with the United 
Nations Organization.”312 In the years between 1945 and 1951, the American military, 
government, and citizenry would increasingly grapple with this thorny issue in local, 
national, and international arenas. 
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B. MANDATES TURNED STRATEGIC TRUSTS 
In a speech on 27 October 1945 commemorating Navy Day, President Truman 
declared his commitment to maintain the “greatest naval power on earth” while 
simultaneously “laying up ships” and “breaking up aircraft squadrons.”313 The postwar 
U.S. military’s purpose would be to “fulfill the military obligations which we are 
undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization – to support a lasting peace, 
by force, if necessary.”314 President Truman also described the fundamentals of his foreign 
policy: “we seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage…we believe that all peoples 
who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of 
government…this is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, and in the Western Hemisphere.”315 
In this speech, President Truman announced three tenets that would define his 
administration’s foreign policy: aspirations of world peace through international 
organizations; upholding the tenets of the Atlantic Charter through self-determination and 
rejecting territorial aggrandizement; and striving to achieve these aims with reduced 
military capabilities.  
President Truman’s tenets, as outlined in his Navy Day speech, were creatively 
applied to ensure long-term U.S. security objectives in the Western Pacific. The islands 
formerly mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, including the Mariana Islands in 
Micronesia, provided an early opportunity for such diplomatic ingenuity. Long after the 
military battles to gain control of these islands, the United States would fight diplomatic 
battles to maintain control of these strategically-located bases.  
The first policy battle, however, occurred within the U.S. government itself. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for U.S. annexation of these strategic outposts. Annexation, 
however, would directly contradict the terms of the Atlantic Charter and the subsequent 
Declaration of the United Nations signed in 1942, which renounced “territorial 
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aggrandizement” as an aim of the Allied war effort.316 Thus, the Department of State faced 
the dilemma of achieving “absolute control” of Micronesia for the military while upholding 
President Roosevelt’s “wartime assurances that the United States would not indulge in 
territorial acquisitions.”317   
The Department of State, and specifically its newly-formed delegation to the United 
Nations, became the central negotiator that sought international and intra-governmental 
consensus on the disposition of the former Japanese possessions in the Pacific. John Foster 
Dulles, as the U.S. representative to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the U.N. 
General Assembly, was crucial in these negotiations.318 To allay military concerns and 
uphold its international image, the U.S. delegation proposed the concept of a “strategic 
trust,” whereby the United Nations would grant the United States legal authority to 
exclusively administer the islands seized in the Pacific war.319 The U.S. delegation 
envisioned this proposal would govern the “minor islands” of Micronesia and the Ryukyus 
left ambiguous in the Potsdam Declaration. Unlike the 11 other trusts adopted at the United 
Nations founding conference on 26 April 1945, the strategic trust system would enable the 
United States to fortify positions in the trust territory and deny access to any part of the 
area for security reasons.320 Additionally, the United Nations Security Council, vice the 
General Assembly, would oversee the strategic trusteeship.321  The United States, as a 
permanent member of the Security Council, could thus veto any detrimental action against 
the strategic trust territories once established. Finally, only “states directly concerned” with 
the strategic trusteeship could amend its status.322  In the Pacific, the United States argued 
their costly war against Japan merited their exclusive right to be the state “directly 
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concerned.”323 This approach savvily employed institutional mechanisms to achieve the 
United States’ security interests while adhering to the tenets of the United Nations. 
Through rounds of negotiations between October to December 1946 at the U.N. 
General Assembly in New York, the U.S. obtained the international acquiescence it 
desired. The first challenge was to convince allies who held trusteeships themselves. The 
United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Belgium all placed their former mandates under 
the new trust system during the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 
January 1946, and expected the United States to follow suit.324  Eventually the key Allied 
stakeholders in the Pacific, Great Britain and Australia, acquiesced to the U.S. strategic 
trusteeship proposal.325  
A more challenging task, however, was convincing the Soviet Union to accept 
strategic trusteeship. The Soviet Union decried the U.S. proposal as a “flagrant violation” 
of the U.N. Charter.326  As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the Soviet 
Union held veto power over the proposal and argued that they should be a “state directly 
concerned” with the strategic trusteeship.327  In response, the U.S. delegation noted the 
hypocrisy of Soviet opposition to the strategic trusteeship in Micronesia while 
simultaneously seeking to annex the Kurile Islands from Japan.328  Just as the Kuriles were 
vital to the Soviet Union, the United States argued Micronesia was vital to its national 
security.329 In compromise, the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. strategic trusteeship in 
return for U.S. acquiescence over the Kurile Islands. Furthermore, the U.S. excluded 
Okinawa and the Bonin Islands from the strategic trusteeship, thereby limiting their 
authority to the former Japanese Mandated Islands. With support from the permanent 
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members of the Security Council, the United States submitted its strategic trusteeship 
proposal to the U.N. on 26 February 1946.330 
On 12 April 1947, the United Nations established the strategic Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, with the United States as the sole administrator.331 President Truman 
signed a joint resolution of Congress to accept the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands on 
18 July 1947.332 The strategic trusteeship satisfied American defense, diplomatic, and 
domestic concerns about the former Japanese mandated islands.  
Civil administration of the Trust Territory was easier to declare than to enact. 
Although Department of Interior Secretary Julius Krug successfully advocated in May 
1947 to assume administrative responsibilities from military government, the department 
could not field sufficient personnel to accomplish this undertaking.333  In the interim, the 
U.S. Navy continued to administer the Northern Mariana Islands and Micronesia. To reflect 
its new status, the U.S. Navy Military Government renamed itself as the U.S. Civil 
Administration. On 1 July 1951, 280 civil servants from the Department of the Interior 
assumed administrative responsibilities for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.334  
The disposition of America’s remaining wartime acquisitions in the Pacific, however, 
proved even more difficult.  
C. CONTAINMENT 
While the U.S. delegation to the U.N. was in the final stages of securing the Trust 
Territory, President Truman announced a new approach in U.S. foreign policy. In an appeal 
to Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman outlined what would become known as 
the Truman Doctrine. With the British unable to support anti-communists in Greece and 
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Turkey, President Truman announced, “it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”335 Contrary to the President’s sweeping rhetoric, Gaddis recounted that “the 
Truman Doctrine implied an open-ended commitment to resist Soviet expansionism, 
therefore, at a time when the means to do so had almost entirely disappeared.”336  It was 
“shock therapy,” according to Gaddis, “a last-ditch effort by the Administration to prod 
Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of world 
leadership.”337 
The same month that President Truman took ownership of the Trust Territory, an 
anonymous author “X” published “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs 
magazine. The author, later revealed to be George Kennan, advocated “a long-term, patient 
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”338 Kennan, who had 
risen to prominence after his “Long Telegram” described Soviet aims in February 1946, 
had become the State Department’s director of the newly created Policy Planning Staff 
(PPS) in May 1946. The “X” article formed the foundations of containment policy, which 
sought to apply “counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points” to prevent Communist expansion.339  Although Kennan later claimed that 
containment in application differed from his policy recommendations, the approach 
became popularly linked to the Truman Doctrine announced several months earlier.   
Between 1947 and 1949, the Truman administration prioritized economic aid over 
military expenditures in order to safeguard vital industrial centers from communist 
influence. As Gaddis observed, “the blunt reality of limited means had once again, as 
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during World War II, forced the making of distinctions between vital and peripheral 
interests.”340 This trade-off was a “calculated risk” recommended by Kennan to 
asymmetrically counter Soviet influence in Europe and Asia.341 Recently promoted 
Secretary of Defense Forrestal stated in December 1947 that foreign policy objectives were 
“economic stability, political stability and military stability…in about that order.”342  To 
align resources with these aims, the Truman administration increased foreign aid at the 
expense of defense spending.343   
In East Asia, this approach justified ongoing initiatives to revitalize strategic 
economies. In 1946 the United States supplied Japan with $188 million in food and raw 
materials, and this amount increased to $300 million in 1947.344 Between September 1945 
and February 1948, the United States contributed $1.43 billion to aid Nationalist China in 
its struggle against the Chinese Communist Party.345 The Foreign Assistance Act of April 
1948 allocated an additional $463 million to China, of which $338 million was economic 
aid.346 A better-known aspect of the Foreign Assistance Act, commonly known as the 
Marshall Plan, initially contributed $5 billion to aid Western Europe. 
In accordance with the “calculated risk,” defense spending decreased from $81.6 
billion in fiscal year 1945 to $44.7 billion in 1946, then to $13.1 billion in 1947.347 For the 
Department of the Navy, these budget reductions corresponded to a $31 billion budget in 
fiscal year 1945, a $24 billion budget in 1946, and a $5 billion budget in 1947.348 In fiscal 
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year 1948, President Truman proposed a $11.2 billion budget for the Army and Navy, then 
directed an additional $650 million cut in Navy expenditures.349 Congress also ended the 
Selective Service on 31 March 1947, which continued a manpower drawdown that began 
shortly after the war.350 The size of the U.S. military decreased from 12 million personnel 
in 1945 to 1.6 million by July 1947.351 Available means no longer supported the Navy’s 
base strategy for the Pacific.  
These reduced means forced military leaders to prioritize the vast network of bases 
in the Pacific by strategic value and economic feasibility. In September 1945, the U.S. 
Navy proposed maintaining 12 active bases in the Pacific, with an additional 15 in a 
reduced status.352 By September 1946, Admiral Towers, Commander-in-Chief Pacific and 
Pacific Ocean Areas, recommended to Admiral Nimitz that active bases in the Pacific be 
reduced to Pearl Harbor, Guam, Saipan, Kwajalein, Okinawa, and Adak in order to avoid 
“foolish” expenditures.353 The Navy proposed reinvesting these savings into maintaining 
a mobile carrier fleet that would be able to counter threats and deter aggression. This 
approach differentiated the Navy’s position from the Army and Air Force, which was 
crucial to gaining an upper hand with Congress amidst increasing inter-service budgetary 
competition.354   
While Admiral Towers did not foresee the need for active bases in the former 
Japanese mandated islands, he argued that the U.S. should maintain exclusive access to 
these islands to prevent repeating the Pacific war.355 In 1947 the Far Eastern Commission 
proposed retaining the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands under long-term U.S. control. 
From these offshore bases, the United States could minimize its occupation effort in 
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mainland Japan while providing a security backstop against a resurgent Japan.356 By 1948, 
however, the Navy pared down its base requirements to the bare minimum: primary bases 
in Hawaii and the Marianas, with secondary bases in the Marshall and Aleutian Islands.357 
This strategic vacillation and decrease in military spending also adversely impacted 
the base politics of Guam and Okinawa. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Navy 
Civil Administration on Guam was already encountering difficulties in compensating 
Guamanians for land by 1947. The military government’s land compensation initiatives on 
Guam, however, were years ahead of their counterparts on the Ryukyu Islands. 
To drive down occupation costs, the U.S. military government took the policy 
position that no compensation would be paid for Okinawan land used for bases.358 Under 
the American military’s interpretation of the Rules of Land Warfare, military necessity 
removed the legal obligation to compensate Okinawans for their land.359 Although the 
military government cooperated with the Okinawan Advisory Council to establish land 
ownership records after the war, “these early claims were fore the mere recognition of 
ownership.”360 Successive campaigns also sought to reduce the military’s overall use of 
Okinawan land, but did not attempt to compensate Okinawan land owners. Disputes over 
compensation and land use surfaced slowly, but surely by the late 1940s.  
The loss of Okinawan land was exacerbated by underdevelopment. Due to the U.S. 
policy of directing occupation costs to the Japanese Government, fewer economic and 
development initiatives were funded outside of U.S. bases. With Okinawa an “occupied 
area,” Under Secretary of the Army William Draper, Jr. summarized the U.S. position that 
“appropriated funds could not be used to pay for indigenous Japanese materials and labor 
utilized for the benefit of the Ryukyu Islands.”361 With every dollar increasingly valuable 
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in the new Pacific strategy, military government budgets were stretched as far as possible. 
As military leaders deferred payments for Okinawan land, however, overall costs to 
maintain U.S. bases only increased with interest. 
As the military revised its Pacific requirements, Kennan traveled to Japan in 
February 1948 to confer with General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers. Both Kennan and MacArthur favored limiting the duration and quantity of 
occupation forces in Japan. As early as March 1947, General MacArthur declared that the 
military occupation of Japan was “approaching such completion as is possible” and that 
the remaining problems in Japan were primarily economic.362 Kennan argued that an 
ongoing occupation of Japan risked creating anti-American sentiments and alienating an 
important potential ally against Communism.363 In the context of these considerations, 
offshore military bases in Okinawa and the Marianas gained appeal. General MacArthur 
related to Kennan that “Okinawa was the most advanced and vital point in this structure” 
which could “easily control every one of the ports of northern Asia from which an 
amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”364   
Kennan accepted the General’s military assessment, and in March 1948 he 
subsequently proposed an offshore defensive perimeter of military bases to secure 
American interest in East Asia:   
Okinawa would be made the center of our offensive striking power in the 
western Pacific area. It would constitute the central and most advanced 
point of a U-shaped U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, Ryukus 
[sic], the former Japanese mandated islands, and of course Guam. We would 
then rely on Okinawa-based air power, plus our advanced naval power, to 
prevent the assembling and launching of any amphibious force from any 
mainland port in the east-central or northeast Asia.365   
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Kennan argued that China, though a wartime ally, was not a vital center of power, 
and thus not worth the vast resources necessary to indefinitely defend it from communist 
forces.366 Kennan’s maritime defense perimeter gained consensus support in the 
Department of Defense and Department of State as the best way to employ limited means 
to achieve American interests in East Asia. On 7 October 1948, Kennan’s proposal was 
adopted in National Security Council memorandum 13/2 (NSC 13/2).367 
D. THE SHOCKS OF 1949 
1949 brought unexpected changes to the domestic and international base politics of 
Guam and Okinawa. Domestically, President Truman surprisingly won the 1948 
presidential election and began another term in 1949. In this new administration, President 
Truman replaced an ailing Secretary Marshall with Republican foreign policy expert Dean 
Acheson. Acheson subsequently replaced George Kennan with Paul Nitze as the Director 
of the Policy Planning Staff. Louis Johnson also replaced a disgraced James Forrestal as 
Secretary of Defense to “accelerate already deep cuts in defense spending that Forrestal 
had resisted.”368 Together, the new administration would affect some of the most 
important changes in base politics in the Western Pacific. 
On the island of Guam, 1949 catalyzed the citizenship movement at the local and 
national level of base politics. After reelection, President Truman declared that the naval 
administration would be an interim government, and on 15 January 1949 the Guam 
Congress resumed its demands for citizenship.369 In February 1949, the Guam Congress 
subpoenaed a Navy civil service employee suspected of dishonest business dealings on the 
island.370 The employee, Abe Goldstein, refused to testify on the grounds that the Guam 
 
366 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 85. 
367 Sarantakes, Keystone, 44. 
368 Green, By More Than Providence, 274. 
369 Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” 74. 
370 Maga, 74. 
 
77 
Congress had no jurisdiction over him, an American citizen.371 Admiral Pownall, still 
leading the Navy Civil Administration, sided with Goldstein and prevented the military 
police from detaining him.372 In protest, Antonio B. Won Pat, Speaker of the House of 
Assembly, dissolved the Guam Congress on 5 March 1949.373 Admiral Pownall attempted 
to hold a special election to replace the emboldened members of the Guam Congress, but 
Guamanian districts refused to nominate any candidates other than their current 
representatives.374 This domestic political row soon rose to the level of national politics. 
The U.S. news media overwhelmingly sided with the Guam Congress and 
pressured the U.S. Navy and President Truman to intervene. On 6 March 1949, the New 
York Times reported “Guam Assembly Quits,” and the next day that “Congress Walks 
Out.”375 In an article entitled “Guam Rebels at New Navy Rule,” printed on 3 April 1949, 
The Washington Post declared that disharmony was inevitable given the structures of the 
administration.376 Even the Honolulu Advertiser reported “Guam Congress Revolt 
Grows.”377 After heated criticism, Admiral Pownall reconvened the dismissed members 
of the Guam Congress in May 1949.378 The issue of Guamanian citizenship, however, had 
gained traction with the American public and at the highest levels of the government. 
President Truman sought to resolve the discord on Guam that affected the United 
States’ international reputation. The Department of State advised the President that, 
although loyal to the United States, Guamanians could become increasingly antagonistic 
unless granted further rights. After receiving recommendations from the State Department 
in May 1949, President Truman directed the Navy to transfer governing responsibilities to 
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the Department of the Interior.379 On 7 September 1949, President Truman signed 
Executive Order 10077 and formally transferred administration responsibilities, effective 
1 July 1950.  
In the intervening year, Guamanians resumed their drive for citizenship and 
recognition. In April 1950, a delegation led by Antonio Won Pat and Francisco Leon 
Guerrero delivered a petition signed by 1,700 Guamanians that supported the organic 
act.380  Between May and July, the organic act steadily progressed through Congress. On 
1 August 1950, President Truman signed the Organic Act of Guam, officially conferring 
citizenship and territorial status to Guam.381 In a nod to Guam’s shared hardships during 
the war, the Organic Act was made retroactive to 21 July, the anniversary of Liberation 
Day.382 Thus, the era of Navy military government on Guam ended with the population 
more closely linked to the United States than ever before.  
As the citizenship movement redefined Guam’s political status, the Truman 
administration also charted a new course for Okinawa and Japan. NSC 13/3, adopted by 
President Truman on 6 May 1949, indicated the United States’ intention to “retain on a 
long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa.”383 Implicitly, NSC 13/3 politically separated 
Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands from the remainder of Japan. The directive also broke 
the diplomatic stalemate that had hindered Okinawa’s economic recovery. With NSC 13/3 
establishing long-term American military interests on Okinawa, the U.S. Government now 
agreed to partially fund Okinawa’s social and economic recovery.384    
In 1949 natural disasters uncovered man-made structural failures on Okinawa. 
Between October 1948 and June 1949, Typhoon Libby, Typhoon Della, and Typhoon 
 
379 Rogers, 203. 
380 Rogers, 205. 
381 Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” 76. 
382 Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall, 205. 
383 Department of State, Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect 
to United States Policy Toward Japan, NSC 13/3 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1949) 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d70. 
384 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 156. 
 
79 
Gloria sank approximately half of all Okinawan fishing vessels, damaged nearly half of all 
buildings on the island, killed 50 military personnel, and seriously injured an additional 
200.385 Visiting the ravaged island in November 1949, journalist Frank Gibney wrote 
“Okinawa: Forgotten Island” for Time magazine, in which he described Okinawa as “the 
end of the Army’s logistics line” and “as a major American base…no credit to 
America.”386 The December 1949 edition of Life magazine ran a similar pictorial entitled 
“The Okinawa Junk Heap: After Four Years of Neglect U.S. Tries to Clean Up A Shameful 
Mess.”387 The article reported that “life on Okinawa is still hard and squalid.”388 The 
typhoons exposed the consequences of years of underfunding and political inattention. 
Unsurprisingly, military leadership did not favorably endorse these reports.  
Public outcry over the conditions in Okinawa spurred an American response. 
Additionally, with the approval of NSC 13/3 and the deteriorating military situation for 
Nationalist China, Okinawa gained strategic value for the U.S. With Okinawa still under 
U.S. Army military government, the Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees toured 
the island, soon followed by Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins.389 As Army 
historian Arnold Fisch observed years later, “even the rubble generated by the typhoons 
could not mask the effects of some three years of Washington’s relative bureaucratic 
neglect.”390 General Collins consequently appointed General Josef Sheetz to take 
command of the island and improve conditions. These structural reorganizations would 
eventually lead to a new era in Okinawan base politics. 
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E. FORMING A DEFENSE PERIMETER IN THE PACIFIC 
The “shocks of 1949,” as Gaddis coined them, set the Truman administration in 
search of a new foreign policy approach.391 Internationally, the loss of China and the 
Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic bomb led political leaders to recalculate the 
communist threat. In January 1950, Secretary Acheson outlined an approach that embraced 
many of the points Kennan earlier articulated.  
In a speech to the National Press Club entitled, “Crisis in China – An Examination 
of United States Policy,” Acheson reassured Americans that a “defensive perimeter runs 
along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands. We hold important 
defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold.”392 While 
Acheson’s “defense perimeter” speech is often remembered for excluding South Korea and 
implicitly inviting North Korean aggression, it also reflected the influence of Kennan’s 
argument, even after his departure from the Policy Planning Staff. 
The same month as the “defense perimeter” speech, President Truman 
commissioned a study to develop policy recommendations for this new geopolitical 
environment. A task-organized team of officials from the State and Defense Department, 
led by Paul Nitze, sent their recommendations to the President on 14 April 1950.393 In a 
policy paper known as National Security Council 68 (NSC-68), the study group 
recommended a major military buildup to oppose communist expansion universally and 
equally in every contested area.394 NSC-68 deliberately did not attempt to quantify, 
however, the means necessary to implement such a policy.  
Although President Truman initially did not endorse the recommendations of NSC-
68, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 brought Nitze’s argument to the 
forefront of policy debates. NSC-68 hardened U.S. foreign policy against communism and 
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entrenched the network of military instillations in the Western Pacific. In the context where 
“a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere,” the concept of a rigid 
perimeter defense in the western Pacific regained prominence.395 After 25 June 1950, the 
United States expanded that defensive perimeter to include South Korea. By October 1950, 
the United States would unsuccessfully attempt to “rollback” North Korean communists. 
Even before the North Korean invasion, Acheson concluded that the occupation of 
Japan must come to an end, and a peace treaty between Japan and the United States should 
be signed.396 The cost of the occupation, concerns of rising anti-American sentiments in 
Japan, and pressure from allies led Acheson to prepare for negotiations.397  Acheson, under 
immense domestic pressure due to the “loss” of China, enlisted John Foster Dulles in May 
1950 to explore terms of a peace treaty with Japan.398 After months of discourse with the 
Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dulles and the State Department 
reached consensus in September 1950. Under the terms of the interagency agreement, the 
United States would pursue a peace treaty with Japan under three main conditions: 
retaining U.S. military bases in Japan after the occupation, implementing the terms of the 
treaty only after the Korean War concluded, and securing “exclusive strategic control of 
the Ryukyu Islands.”399 Thus, the resolution of the Okinawa issue was tied to the signing 
of the peace treaty with Japan.  
On 14 September 1950, President Truman charged Dulles with the dual tasks of 
negotiating a peace treaty with Japan and also a collective security arrangement to maintain 
long-term stability in the region.400 Multiple obstacles faced Dulles and his negotiating 
team, however. First, allies who had fought alongside the United States through the Pacific 
war were understandably concerned about a resurgent Japan. Second, Japan was eager for 
a peace settlement and an end to the occupation, but wary of the terms imposed by the 
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United States. Primarily, Japan did not want to cede control of Okinawa, which it 
incorporated peacefully before the war. To accomplish his objectives, Dulles employed 
legalistic devices and bilateral consultation, tactics he successfully used to obtain strategic 
trusteeship over Micronesia in 1947. 
As with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1947, the State Department 
assumed the responsibility of devising a politically palatable solution to the United States’ 
strategic security problem. To solve this conundrum, Dulles proposed the legalistic concept 
of Japanese “residual sovereignty” over Okinawa.401 In Dulles’ proposal, Japan would 
retain long-term ownership of Okinawa, but the United States would retain military control 
over the strategic island into the undetermined future. This solution avoided the pugilistic 
negotiations required to secure strategic trusteeship in the U.N., preempted Russian charges 
of colonialism, and reassured Japanese that their country would not be dismembered.  
As at the U.N. General Assembly in 1946, the United States had to reassure its 
allies before continuing this diplomatic maneuver. Australia and New Zealand opposed a 
collective security pact with the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines due to the concern of being 
committed to another war.402 In turn, the United States rejected Australia and New 
Zealand’s counteroffer of including Great Britain in the Pacific security alliance.403 
Retaining U.S. troops in Okinawa, however, reassured Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines that the U.S. would not allow a resurgent Japan to threaten its neighbors.404 
Though the multilateral security organization that President Truman envisioned did not 
materialize, the United States would become the center of new bilateral alliances with 
Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. By implementing this “hub and spoke” 
model of bilateral security alliances in the Pacific, the United States inadvertently increased 
the importance of its position on Okinawa and the Marianas.405   
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To ensure Okinawa’s long-term viability as a base in the defensive perimeter, the 
U.S. military conceded to financially compensating Okinawans for their land. On 5 
December 1950, General MacArthur directed the U.S. commander of the Ryukyu Islands 
to ensure due process in land acquisitions, clarify ownership of disputed lands, and pay 
rent for acquired land.406 The recently-reorganized Real Estate Division of the military 
government undertook the task of accomplishing General MacArthur’s guidance, and 
appraised 39,000 acres of land valued at approximately $10 million.407  For fiscal year 
1951, the Real Estate Division proposed leasing Okinawan-owned land for 20 years at six 
percent of their appraised value.408 This policy not only reflected the long-term intentions 
of the U.S., but also established a fundamental legitimating mechanism that would define 
Okinawan base politics for decades to come. 
Yet despite these belated steps towards addressing land usage, contentious issues 
remained on Okinawa. The same directive from General MacArthur that agreed to 
compensation for land also established the U.S. Civil Administration for the Ryukyu 
Islands. While this formally ended the U.S. military government on 15 December 1950, it 
also heralded long-term occupation to the Okinawan people.409 Between May and August 
1951, 71.1 percent of all eligible Okinawan voters, 199,000 people in total, signed a 
petition to revert to Japanese administration.410  This was the first major political 
movement in postwar Okinawa and would portend protest movements by an increasingly 
active and aggrieved island population. 
The signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 officially ended the war with Japan 
and entrenched the United States military’s position in the Western Pacific. Surrounding 
the 8 September signing ceremony, the United States separately cemented its bilateral 
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security agreements with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In these 
accompanying events, John Foster Dulles also publicly debuted the concept of Japan’s 
“residual sovereignty” over Okinawa.411 While the signing of the San Francisco Treaty 
began the long procession towards ending U.S. control of Okinawa, it also propagated base 
politics begun under U.S. military government. The dynamics of land usage, redressing 
grievances, and compensation would continue to affect Okinawa for decades more. By 
confining these forces to the Prefecture, however, American leaders sought to stabilize the 
wider Western Pacific. 
F. CONCLUSION 
At the end of World War II, the United States held unprecedented power in the 
Pacific. Following the war, however, American foreign policy makers judiciously weighed 
ways and means against ends. The means and ways Americans considered were not only 
material, however. Ideologies played an important role in constructing the U.S. foreign 
policy between 1945 and 1951. Although the American public initially stereotyped the 
populations of the Marinas and Okinawa, civil society challenged preconceived narratives 
and humanized these peoples. With their grievances framed in the context of American 
values, Chamorro and Okinawan issues gained traction at the highest levels of U.S. 
government. Accordingly, the United States went to great lengths to obtain its security 
objectives while simultaneously preserving its legitimacy and restraining its power through 
multilateral institutions.  
Foresighted scholars and diplomats, such as Kennan and Dulles, reconciled 
competing ideologies and advanced a more pragmatic approach to U.S. foreign policy. The 
strategic value and vague sovereignties of the Mariana Islands and Okinawa made them 
ideal objectives for this pragmatism. The United States did not outright annex these 
strategic outposts in order to support the fledgling United Nations’ legitimacy – and its 
own. Similarly, the United States did not demand sovereignty of Okinawa in order to 
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embrace an important future ally. This pragmatism contributed to the new order created by 
the San Francisco Treaty. 
Ideologies also hindered American foreign policy, however. Just as Americans 
initially simplified their understanding of peoples on the Marianas and Okinawa, American 
policy makers reduced complex military and geopolitical calculations into domestically-
digestible solutions. These ideologies and their supporting rhetoric restricted the options 
U.S. policy makers deemed politically feasible. As Gaddis mourned, “Washington officials 
encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American 
diplomacy in an ideological straightjacket.”412  Dissociated from means, ways, and 
justifications to citizens, American ideologies later advocated ends that would prove 
unachievable. Only after bearing the costs incurred by exceeding available means, 
however, can one truly appreciate the pragmatism with which American policy makers 
created a new security order in the Western Pacific between 1945 and 1951. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempts to analyze how the diverse civil-military interactions on Guam, 
the Northern Marianas, and Okinawa shaped the development of long-term basing 
agreements in the Pacific. In the formative years between 1944 and 1951, the United States 
created a new security apparatus that spanned across oceans, connected nations, and 
extended down to military bases across the Pacific. The populations of these strategic 
outposts also redefined their position in the world after the cataclysm of World War II 
upheaved decades of existing political and social structures. Between these two forces, U.S. 
military governments implemented national policies, mediated local tensions, and created 
unique outcomes through their methods in each location.  
The Northern Mariana Islands are a case study in base politics that perpetuates the 
wisdom of George Kennan’s defensive perimeter concept. Heavily populated by Japanese 
citizens and autocratically controlled by the Japanese Empire for nearly 30 years, the 
populations of Saipan and Tinian were on a trajectory towards closer ties with Japan. Yet, 
after the war, the U.S. military government ruled the islands relatively easily. With the 
massive repatriation of Japanese citizens, Navy civil affairs officers achieved nearly total 
cooperation with the indigenous population. For a relatively minimal cost and with few 
personnel, Navy military government ensured access to a key strategic link in the Pacific 
defensive perimeter. Though imperfect and subject to variances in governors, the Navy 
created the foundations for social, political, and economic integration with the United 
States. Eventually, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands gained autonomy through the 
Compact of Free Association, becoming several island states that relied on the United 
States for defense and federal services. These trends towards affective politics reached a 
crescendo when the population decided to join the United States as the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands. 
Guam presents a more complex case study in base politics with deeper historical 
influences. The war indelibly linked the identity of many Guamanians to America, and 
these effects persisted well into the future. Amidst discussion of reorganizing U.S. forces 
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in 2009, 71 percent of Guamanians supported an increased military presence.413 With more 
than 40 years of shared history before the war, however, not all Guamanian perceptions of 
Navy military government were not favorably altered by the liberation of the island from 
the Japanese military. Influential actors continued to oppose the terms of military 
government until the status quo changed.  
The citizenship movement on Guam also adds nuance to Calder’s ideal type base 
supporters. Calder classified national-level politicians and conservative business leaders as 
some of the most influential supporters of foreign bases.414 Furthermore, Calder argued 
that “more likely than not, base backers are pragmatic and nationalistic, but not 
ideological.”415  While the citizenship movement on Guam was rooted in pragmatic 
grievances, it was also intimately tied to ideological aspirations for political recognition 
and equality before law. Neither was the citizenship movement explicitly for or against 
U.S. military bases. Indeed, many Guamanians joined the U.S. military to obtain 
citizenship before the Organic Act was signed, and many Guamanians still serve in the 
U.S. military. In fact, Guam has a higher enlistment rate than any U.S. state, and suffered 
four times the national average of casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.416 The 
greatest grievances in base politics on Guam were not necessarily American military 
imposition, but rather that the populations under military administration were not governed 
equally as Americans. This dichotomy between ideals and practice will continue to affect 
base politics as long as it exists. 
Okinawa proved to be one of the United States’ longest and most challenging cases 
in foreign administration. Civil-military issues regarding land use, compensation, and 
reconstruction originated under military government rule. The institutional responses to 
those issues would be repeatedly redeployed under successive administrations. Although 
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military government officially ended in 1950, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu 
Islands effectively continued American rule on Okinawa until 1972. The functions of the 
Real Estate Division lived on through the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and 
the Japanese government assumed the corresponding compensation payments for land.417 
In this period, Okinawa hosted increasingly important American military bases in the 
Western Pacific.   
It is also worth assessing the overall effectiveness of U.S. military governments on 
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. While budgets and personnel are 
common targets of fiscal constraints, it is important to justify the ways and means with end 
results. Both subjectively and objectively, the Navy’s military governments enabled the 
postwar security order that turned the Pacific Ocean into the American Lake.  
Navy military governments contributed to the legitimacy of the United States, an 
intangible but consequential factor in military occupations. The vast humanitarian relief 
efforts that followed battles across the Pacific engendered mutual affection that facilitated 
cooperation in the early days of military government. Control and security derived from 
cooperation, and in this way, military government directly enabled the prosecution of 
further military objectives. These effects contributed to what Calder observed as “the 
stabilizing heritage of liberating occupations.”418 
This legitimacy enabled American diplomats to rebuff charges of neocolonialism 
on the international stage, and facilitated diplomatic arrangements such as the strategic 
trust system that authorized American rule of the former Japanese Mandated Islands. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that American diplomats could have defended military bases in 
Micronesia and on Okinawa without credible and legitimate forces upholding widely – 
accepted responsibilities under international law. This legitimacy was even more important 
as the United States nurtured a new system of international alliances and institutions to 
stabilize the postwar world. 
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Practically, it is doubtful that any governmental organization other than the U.S. 
military could have planned, coordinated, and executed operations of this scale. While 
civilian administration earlier in the postwar period would likely have increased positive 
perceptions of the U.S., the military mobilized and deployed civil affairs forces with 
uncanny speed and efficiency. The Department of the Interior was the only other 
organization vying for administration of liberated and occupied territories, but no training 
or education infrastructure existed to compete with the military. The Department of 
Interior’s delayed assumption of administrative responsibilities for the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands suggest that the military’s wartime mobilization of academics and 
civilian affairs officers was not only effective, but irreplaceable. 
Objectively, military governments yielded disproportionate returns on investment. 
With 243 civil affairs personnel on Saipan and Tinian in July 1945, the United States 
retained critical terrain that directly contributed to the defeat of Japan.419 For $275 million 
in base development, military government, and civilian reconstruction, by 1945 the U.S. 
military gained Naval Base Guam, the future Andersen Air Force Base, and headquarters 
for the Pacific Fleet and 20th Air Force.420 By the end of the war, 201,718 U.S. service 
members occupied Guam in preparation for future operations.421 At the height of its effort 
in July 1945, 2,600 U.S. Navy civil affairs personnel on Okinawa facilitated the garrison 
of 259,000 U.S. troops that were preparing to invade Japan.422  Military government 
enabled the U.S. to occupy nearly 394 square miles of the island in the same period.423   
Though the exact figures fluctuated in the subsequent years, the relative value of 
these strategic outposts only increased after the war. Forces based on Okinawa, Guam, and 
the Northern Marianas were critical in defending American interests in Korea, Vietnam, 
and beyond. Their persistence demonstrates the potential outcomes when academic 
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expertise and military preparations create an understanding of base politics at the local, 
national, and international level.    
These cases were studied historically to understand the origins of base politics on 
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. As Calder observed in Embattled 
Garrisons, “the crucial imperative, historical experience suggests, is thus for occupiers to 
be perceived in host nations as liberators, not imperialists.”424 The period between 1944 
and 1951 largely established the United States’ perception, for better or worse on these 
islands. These civil-military interactions were dependent on the actions of local leaders, 
individual bureaucrats, and civil affairs officers through more than six years of 
administration. “The individual decision maker,” Calder remarked, is “the level at which 
actual real-world decisions are made.”425 Navy military government in the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa, not only established many of the institutions that 
defined future paradigms of base politics, but also influenced individual actors in base 
politics. 
A. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
This study aimed to contextualize the role of heritage in base politics of the Pacific. 
Calder stated that “historical origins, in short, are crucial to understanding the institutional 
environment in which base politics develops thereafter.”426 Base politics are not static, 
however, and many developments occurred in the years since military government 
concluded its mission on Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. As such, 
there is great opportunity to further study contemporary developments in the base politics 
of these particular locations. Furthermore, there is ample opportunity to analyze additional 
case studies to test Calder’s theories of base politics. 
While Embattle Garrisons thoroughly described base politics of contemporary 
Okinawa, few commensurate examinations have been conducted into the contemporary 
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base politics of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. As discussed earlier, Calder’s 
framework for understanding base politics did not originally intend to address U.S. military 
bases on domestics soil. As this work detailed, however, Guam and the Northern Marianas 
Islands do not fit neatly into any one category. Geographically linked in the same island 
chain, these two locations shared a common history and developmental trajectory until first 
being colonized by the Spanish, then further diverged politically after the Spanish–
American War in 1898. Successive world wars piqued this divergence, and only slowly 
after World War II did these islands politically and socially reconcile.  
As the Northern Mariana Islands moved towards association with the United States, 
however, collective memories of Japanese collaboration during the Pacific War led 
Guamanians to reject union with their neighbors in the former Mandated Islands. Even 
with both locations incorporated into the United States, historical grievances separate the 
two largest population centers of Guam and Saipan, despite their geographic separation of 
only 136 miles. History, memory, and identity clearly still affect local politics to this day, 
and it is logical to reason that these forces affect base politics as well. The specific ways in 
which these forces act, however, are worthy of further study. 
This study also contains a relatively small sample size and only aimed to explain 
the historical affect on outcomes at these three locations. Larger sample sizes with relevant 
cases could yield theoretical instead of simply explanatory results. American Samoa circa 
1941–1951 and Hawaii circa 194–1959 are case studies that would illuminate the United 
States’ wider employment of military government to secure overseas bases. These cases 
may also help develop theories in subnational base politics and contextualize the American 
practice of assimilating overseas possessions. Diego Garcia circa 1968–present and Souda 
Bay circa 1969–present are potential case studies to provide international context and 
alternative strategies to overseas basing. All these suggested cases are inherently naval in 
nature and reflect the great power competitions of their era. Additionally, these locations 
were primarily selected for their strategic and military value rather than economic or 
material value.  
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B. APPLICABILITY TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
The National Security Strategy of 2017 declared that, “after being dismissed as a 
phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.”427 The National 
Defense Strategy subsequently observed that “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and 
security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition.”428  As the United States 
military again prepares for strategic competition, it is worth understanding how military 
forces translated operational success to enduring strategic advantage.  
World War II marked the U.S. military’s first attempt to educate dedicated civil 
affairs forces for military government.429 Amidst the greatest power competition in 
history, the U.S. military government on the Northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa 
solidified the U.S. Navy’s maritime superiority that was achieved at great cost during the 
war. The civil affairs personnel who achieved these aims were the product of a years-long 
investment that required the manpower, education, and institutions of a nation fully 
mobilized for war. While these World War II–era academic institutions exist in 
contemporary forms, their success still requires foresighted application.  
Insightful leaders forecasted the need for post-war governance and formulated 
appropriate doctrine, organizations, and training early in the war. Americans widely 
mobilized for the war and brought to the services a wealth of experience and education that 
directly applied to civil affairs. Academics from across the country volunteered their 
expertise and applied their knowledge to the U.S. military government effort. Their efforts 
solidified the U.S. military’s position on what General Douglas MacArthur declared as, 
“the most advanced and vital point” that could “easily control every one of the ports of 
northern Asia from which an amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”430  
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As U.S. military bases endured on these small Pacific Islands, however, historical, 
pragmatic, and ideological tensions surfaced. The peoples of Guam, the Northern 
Marianas, and Okinawa recovered from the cataclysmic Pacific War and hoped for a more 
prosperous, more equal future. Ironically, U.S. Navy military governments implemented 
the social initiatives that instilled this distinctly American vision for the future in the 
population, yet did not always fulfill expectations. As time progressed, reconciling these 
ideals with practical limitations proved to be the greatest challenge to the longevity of 
American military bases. 
These aspirations for agency were not confined to U.S. military bases in the 
Western Pacific, however. American experiences in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
indicate that local civil-military grievances will continue to affect the viability and efficacy 
of U.S. military forces overseas. Writing of Long An Province in Vietnam circa 1967, 
Jeffrey Race observed that “man is moved by the need for spiritual values: a sense of power 
over his own destiny, a sense of respect from his fellow man.”431 Although diagnosing the 
causes of revolutionary conflict, Race’s findings also apply to larger issues of instability in 
civil-military interactions. Race noted that “a decade and a half of killing and destruction 
in Long An provides evidence of the superhuman sacrifices which some men, deprived of 
these values, will endure to redress their deprivation.”432 In Long An, individual agency 
and domestic discord upended the best laid plans guided by foreign policy theories. 
Having served as a junior Army officer in Vietnam, Race recalled “my fellow 
officers and I frequently had to make decisions affecting people’s lives with an insufficient 
understanding both of actual conditions and of the nature of the conflict itself which we 
were a part.”433 Misdiagnosing drivers of instability at the local level directly affected 
national and international responses. “This widespread failure of understanding,” Race 
later reflected, “permitted a belief at higher levels of government in possibilities that did 
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not actually exist, in turn leading to increased intervention and to the high costs which the 
failure of that intervention has subsequently entailed.”434   
To gain understanding and remedy this shortcoming, Race embarked on an 
ambitious personal and academic venture. “When I began, my effort was focused on such 
issues as force deployment, allocations among types of forces, weaponry, and training,” 
Race recalled.435 “In other words, the issues which I had been led to believe were important 
during my army training.”436 In Race’s perspective, military studies commissioned during 
the war analyzed the wrong aspects of society to adequately resolve local grievances. 
Similarly, academics and journalists similarly lacked historical and social context to 
challenge established narratives of the conflict, and merely served as a “transmission belt 
for statistics and reports of military engagements.”437 “Consequently,” Race recalled, “I 
gradually redirected my inquiry into the areas of social and economic policies and power 
relationships which now appeared more fundamental.”438 
Years later, Carter Malkasian observed a similar effect in the Afghan village of 
Garmser in Helmand Province. Land disputes, local political divisions, and a 
misunderstanding of the situation by national and international political leaders allowed 
for a “missed opportunity” to stabilize the region.439 “Land has often driven people to 
rebel,” Malkasian observed, and “land has been causing conflict in Garmser since the 
canals had been completed in the early 1970s.”440  “The Afghan government had no land 
reform policy,” however, and even nullified land claims granted under previous 
administrations.441 Malkasian decried that “condoning this policy was one of America’s 
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greatest mis-steps in Afghanistan.”442 These factors, according to Malkasian, are why “the 
United States and Great Britain fought so long in Afghanistan for so little gain.”443  
As Jeffrey Race and Carter Malkasian detailed in Vietnam and Afghanistan, 
respectively, stabilizing local politics through military actions and national policy are 
easier said than done. Lack of political recognition and disputes over compensation for 
land, sources of instability on Guam and Okinawa, also increased volatility and violence 
in Long An and Garmser. These cases do not indicate that future conflicts will avoid such 
difficult civil-military entanglements either. 
Contemporary American conflicts have suffered from the U.S. military’s aversion 
to long-term governing responsibilities. As journalist Thomas Ricks reported in 2006, 
“because the Pentagon assumed that U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators and that an 
that an Iraqi government would be stood up quickly, it didn’t plan seriously for less rosy 
scenarios.”444 Consequently, “there was no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad, 
creating an interim government, hiring government and essential services employees, and 
ensuring that the judicial system was operational.”445 Kent Calder himself noted, “in a 
post-9/11 world, in which interventionism and ‘nation-building’ are once again in vogue, 
the early post-World War II cases may provide insights into what occupations contribute 
to making a foreign military presence enduring.”446  
In the context of these contemporary challenges, the era of military government in 
the Pacific provides an example of relatively successful civil-military interactions. As these 
cases in the Pacific demonstrated, effective civil-military relations were essential to 
entrenching long-term security arrangements. Recognizing this dynamic, U.S. military 
leaders of the World War II era resourced, developed, and fielded capabilities to perpetuate 
American control of overseas bases. A return to great power competition, then, should not 
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be equated with a decreased importance of civil-military interactions. Highly educated civil 
affairs forces proved to be one of the only tools readily available to stabilize post – conflict 
territory, transform operational objectives to strategic advantage, and create time for 
diplomatic maneuvering.  
The ways in which military governments accomplished their mission were as 
important as their means. As Race asserted, “a humane society provides wide satisfaction 
for these spiritual needs, reaping domestic peace as its reward.”447 On Guam, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, and Okinawa, Navy military government nurtured societies in ways that 
were remarkably humane in contrast to the destruction that preceded them. Academics, 
journalists, and civil servants informed and improved military government policies, to the 
betterment of local, national, and international base politics. Pragmatic diplomats lessened 
the constraining effects of ideology to achieve strategic security concerns through 
compromise and not coercion. In conclusion, the Navy’s foray into military government 
was a complex effort that incorporated expertise and accommodated dissent from all levels 




447 Race, War Comes to Long An, 276. 
98 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
99 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Appleman, Roy. Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington, DC: United States Army Center 
of Military History, 1948. 
Blackford, Mansel G. Pathways to the Present: U.S. Development and its Consequences 
in the Pacific. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007. 
Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs 1945–47. New York, NY: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1948. 
Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs 1947–48. New York, NY: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1949.  
Calder, Kent E. Embattled Garrisons. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Cha, Victor D. Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
Chen, Ching-chih. “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire.” In The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, edited by Ramon Myers and Mark 
Peattie, 213–239. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Chen, Edward I-te. “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives.” In The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, edited by Ramon Myers and Mark 
Peattie, 240–274. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Coles, Henry L. and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. 
Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992. 
Crowl, Philip A. Campaign in the Marianas. Washington, DC: United States Army 
Center of Military History, 1993. 
Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
Department of the Navy. Civil Affairs Handbook, Mandated Mariana Islands, OpNav 
P22-8. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1944. 
Department of the Navy. Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands. OpNav 13–
31. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1944. 
100 
Department of State, Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With 
Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan, NSC 13/3. Washington, DC: 
Department of State, 1949. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ 
frus1949v07p2/d70. 
Department of War and Department of the Navy. U.S. Army and Navy Manual of 
Military Government and Civil Affairs. FM 27-5/OpNav 50E-3. Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 1943. 
Dorrance, John C. The United States and the Pacific Islands. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1992. 
Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company / The New Press, 2000. 
Embree, John F. Military Government in Saipan and Tinian. Cambridge, MA: The 
Society for Applied Anthropology, 1946. 
Fisch Jr., Arnold G. Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–1950. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.  
Follett, Helen. Ocean Outposts. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942. 
Friedman, Hal M. Creating an American Lake : United States Imperialism and Strategic 
Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945–1947. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, Incorporated, 2000. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
Friedman, Hal M. Governing the American Lake: The U.S. Defense and Administration 
of the Pacific, 1945–1947. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 
2007. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York, NY: Penguin 
Books, 2011. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1982. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941–1947. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972. 
Goodman, Grant K. and Felix Moos, eds. The United States and Japan in the Western 
Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1981. 
Gunther, John. “Our Pacific Frontier.” Foreign Affairs 18, no. 4 (July 1940): 583–600. 
101 
Hara, Kimie. “Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific: ‘An American 
Lake.’” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus 5, no. 8 (August 2007): 1–28. 
Higa, Mikio. Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa. Vancouver, Canada: University 
of British Columbia, 1963.  
Hornung, Jeffrey W. The U.S. Military Laydown on Guam: Progress and Challenges. 
Washington, DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Inoue, Masamichi S. Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of 
Globalization. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
Karasik, Daniel D. “Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction.” The 
Far Easter Quarterly 7, no. 3 (May 1948): 254–267.  
Keesing, Felix M. “Education and Native Peoples: A Study in Objectives.” Pacific 
Affairs 5, no. 8 (August 1932): 675–688.  
Kerr, George. Okinawa, The History of an Island People. Clarendon, VT: Tuttle 
Publishing, 2000. 
Kinzler, Stephen. “Cruel Realities: The American Conquest of Guam.” World Policy 
Journal 23, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 100–104. 
Krieger, Herbert. Island Peoples of the Western Pacific, Micronesia and Melanesia no. 
16. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute, 1943. https://library.si.edu/digital-
library/book/islandpeoplesofw16krie.  
Lattimore, Eleanor. “Pacific Ocean or American Lake?”  Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 22 
(November 1945): 313 – 316. 
Leff, David N. Uncle Sam’s Pacific Islets. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1940. 
Maga, Timothy P. “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–195.” Pacific Historical 
Review 53, no. 1 (February 1984): 59–77. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3639379 
Malkasian, Carter. War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan 
Frontier. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.  
102 
Moos, Felix, Carl Lande, and Nobleza Asuncion-Lande, “An Historical Overview: 
Micronesia and Papua New Guinea.” In The United States and Japan in the 
Western Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, edited by Grant K. 
Goodman and Felix Moos, 17–62. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981. 
Morris, M. D. Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail. New York, NY: Hawthorne Books, 1968. 
Mydens, Carl. “The Okinawa Junk Heap: After Four Years of Neglect U.S. Tries to 






Nufer, Harold F. Micronesia Under American Rule: An Evaluation of the Strategic 
Trusteeship (1947–77). Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1978. 
Patterson, Rebecca. “Revisiting a School of Military Government.” Kauffman 
Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics no. 3 (June 2011). 
Peattie, Mark R. Nanyo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988. 
Rabson, Steve. “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and 
‘Reconstruction.’” Japan Policy Research Institute no. 8 (October 1996). 
Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972. 
Richard, Dorothy. United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, Volume I: The Wartime Military Government Period 1942–1945. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957. 
Richard, Dorothy. United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, Volume II: The Postwar Government Era 1945–1947. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957. 
Richard, Dorothy. United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, Volume III: The Trusteeship Period 1947–1951. Washington, DC: 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957. 
Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York, NY: 
Penguin Press, 2006.  
Rogers, Robert F. Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam. Honolulu, HI: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2011. 
103 
Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawan and the 
U.S.-Japanese Relations. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 
2000. 
Siddle, Richard. “Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa Before 1945.” Japan Studies 18 
no. 2 (May 1998): 117–133. 
Siddle, Richard. “Return to Uchina: the Politics of Identity in Contemporary Okinawa.” 
In Japan and Okinawa; Structure and Subjectivity, edited by Glenn D. Hook and 
Richard Siddle, 133–147. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.  
Smithsonian Libraries. “Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies.” 
https://library.si.edu/digital-library/collection/war-background-series  
Thompson, Laura. “Crisis on Guam.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 6, no. 1 (November 
1946): 5–11. 
Toshiaki, Furuki. “Considering Okinawa as a Frontier.” In Japan and Okinawa: Structure 
and Subjectivity, edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle, 21–38. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
Tze, May Loo. Heritage Politics: Shuri Castle and Okinawa’s Incorporation into 
Modern Japan, 1879–2000. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. 
Weare, Neil and Rodney Cruz. “Guam, America’s Forgotten Front Line.” New York 
Times, August 14, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/guam-
north-korea-american-ally-.html. 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
105 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
